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NOTE
CONTRACT DRAFTSMANSHIP UNDEIR ARTICLE TWO
OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
He who will not apply new remedies must expect new evils.!
In the past few years, more than half the states 2 have adopted the
Uniform Commercial Code, perhaps "the most extensive piece of legislation
ever undertaken at any time, anywhere." 3 Article two accomplishes a
fundamental modernization of the law governing the sale of goods.4 Com-
mentators have devoted surprisingly little attention, however, to the Code's
direct effect upon businessmen, the very class for whose benefit much of
the Code was drafted.5 The businessman's practical needs concern neither
the relative merits of alternative systems of jurisprudence nor changes
in abstract principles of law. Rather, like Holmes' "bad man," he wants
to know the practical consequences of various courses of action-"what the
courts in fact will do" in interpreting his contract clauses.
Freedom of contract and fundamental fairness are complementary goals
that the Code strives to gain for buyer and seller alike. Despite argu-
ments that the Code has subverted cherished "freedom of contract" prin-
ciples, it primarily attacks unfair methods and permits the process of open
negotiation to mold most substantive contract provisions. The Code does
not oppose implied warranty disclaimers, but only the practice of dis-
claiming them in vague and inconspicuous terms that the average buyer
may not notice or comprehend. 6 Similarly, restriction of the buyer's
remedies is not prohibited, but the Code assures that the buyer understand
when the contractually provided remedy is exclusive.7 The Code does not
invalidate clauses precluding postcontractual modification except by a signed
writing; to the contrary, except in a few states, the Code makes them
enforceable for the first time, but insures that the buyer assume them
1 BAcON, Of Innovations, in THE ESSAYS OF FRANCIS BACON 59 (1920).
2 Schnader, Foreword to CARROLL & WrIEsm, FORMS FOR COMmcIAL TRAxs-
ACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COmMER CIAL CODE at xxxiii (table 1) (1963).
3 Malcolm, The Proposed Commercial Code, 6 Bus. LAw. 113, 114 (1951); see
Schnader, Foreword to UNIFORm LAWS ANNOTATED, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
at vii (1962).
4 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE [hereinafter cited as UCC] § 1-102(2) (a). Un-
less otherwise stated UCC citations are to the 1958 Official Text. See also AssN.
OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEw YORK, REPORT ON THE PROPOSED UNIFORM COM-
mmcIAL CODE 15 (1953).
5 See UCC § 1-102(2) (b).
6 See section II(B) infra.
7 See section III (A) infra.
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consciously.8 The Code does, however, entirely remove certain terms and
techniques from the parties' reach. It purportedly prohibits most dis-
claimers of express warranty, and certain consequential damage limitations
are now "prima facie unconscionable." 10 But the parties can still salvage
some measure of "freedom" of contract by drafting agreements to avoid
direct contravention of these antagonistic Code policies. Although article
two requires higher standards of fairness and clarity of expression, it rarely
prevents parties from fairly allocating risks as they had in the past."1
Urging contract draftsmen to reexamine tried and trusted clauses in
light of changes in the law, this Note examines the Code's impact to ascer-
tain the changes required in typical sales contract provisions.
I. CONTRACT PROVISIONS CONTROLLING THE TERMS OF AGREEMENT
A. Promises Made During Negotiations
1. Excluding Oral Representations
Prior to the Code, the parol evidence rule guarded sellers from unin-
tended warranties deriving from the exaggerated assurances of commission-
minded salesmen or convincing fabrications by disappointed buyers.' 2 Under
this legal principle, a writing complete on its face was presumed to be an
"integration" embodying the entire agreement between the parties, and ex-
trinsic evidence was not admissible to establish additional agreements.
1 3
Having inserted into their form sales contracts only those warranties
desired, sellers buttressed the parol evidence rule's protection against addi-
tional express warranty liability by paraphrasing it in merger clauses:
This contract . . . contains the entire agreement between the
parties. There are no oral understandings, representations or
agreements relative to this contract which are not fully expressed
herein.1 4
S See section I(B) (1) infra.
9 See section II(A) infra.
10 See section III(B) infra.
11See UCC § 2-303. "Neither the changes in language, nor the alterations in
approach bring about revolutionary changes in results" under article two. Hogan,
The Highways and Some of the Byways in the Sales and Bulk Sales Articles of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 1-2 (1962). See also Preface to
Del Duca & King, Commercial Code Litigation (mimeo. ed. 1961).
12 See generally 3 CoRB i, CONrRACrS § 573 (1960). McCormick describes the
rule as a ritualistic proscription to permit the court to decide the credibility of oral
testimony by preventing the jury from hearing it. McCormick, The Parol Evidence
Rule as a Procedural Device for Control of the Jury, 41 YALE L.J. 365 (1932).
13 E.g., Seitz v. Brewers' Refrigerating Mach. Co., 141 U.S. 510, 517 (1891)
Wheeler, Kelly & Hagny Inv. Co. v. Curts, 158 Kan. 312, 316, 147 P.2d 737, 740
(1944) ; Vito v. Birkel, 209 Pa. 206, 208, 58 At. 127, 128 (1904) (per curiam).
14 The contract of J. P. Stevens Co., New York City: "This contract supersedes
Buyer's purchase order and/or contract and contains the entire agreement between
the parties. There are no oral understandings relative to this contract which are not
fully expressed herein."
The New York Law Revision Commission recites as the usual merger clause:
"[T]his writing contains the entire agreement between buyer and seller and no
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However, merger clauses were usually unnecessary under the prior law,
because courts generally presumed that any written agreement detailed
enough on its face to create a definite and complete legal obligation con-
stituted in legal contemplation, if not in actual fact, the entire understand-
ing between the parties.' 5
Code section 2-202 16 drastically diminishes the exclusionary effect of
writings 17 and consequently enhances the desirability to sellers of merger
clauses.18  The Code provides that although a writing intended as final may
not be contradicted, parol evidence of "consistent additional terms" may
"supplement" it, unless the court finds that the parties intended the writing
as a "complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement." 19
The Code thus presumes that even "final" contracts are only partially in-
tegrated s ° and that the extent of the partial integration depends upon the
parties' actual intent to include within their agreement additional parol
warranties have been made other than those stated herein." 1 NEW YORK LAW
REVISION CoMM'N, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 601 (Legislative Doc.
No. 65, 1955) [hereinafter cited as N.Y. CODE STUDY]; see Ideal Heating Co. v.
Kramer, 127 Iowa 137, 143, 102 N.W. 840, 842 (1905).
15 See, e.g., Seitz v. Brewers' Refrigerating Mach. Co., 141 U.S. 510, 511, 517
(1891) (no merger clause); Gianni v. R. Russell & Co., 281 Pa. 320, 126 At. 791
(1924) (same). But cf. 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §582, at 457 (1960), attributing to
some courts the practice of weighing all offered extrinsic evidence and rejecting that
which seems "flimsy and improbable."
1 Terms . . . which are . . . set forth in a writing intended by the parties
as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are
included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement
or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or supple-
mented . . .
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the
writing to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive
statement of the terms of the agreement.
UCC § 2-202.
17 See UCC § 2-202, comment 1; TEXAS LEGISLATIVE CouNCIL, ANALYSES OF
ARTICLE 2 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 285-86 (Legislative Doe. No. 52Mo3,
1953) [hereinafter cited as TEXAS CODE STUDY].
Citations to "comments" are to those accompanying the 1958 Official Text unless
otherwise stated. Controversy has arisen over the proper use of these comments.
Subsection 1-102(3) (f) of the 1952 Official Text provided that the comments "may
be consulted" in interpreting the Code if text and comments did not conflict. Statu-
tory recognition of the comments was later withdrawn. EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS 1-3. Revised comments, how-
ever, accompany the 1957, 1958, and 1962 Official Texts. The comments are de-
fended in Report of Committee on Sales Transactions, 6 Bus. LAW. 142 (1951);
Report of Committee on the Proposed Commercial Code, 6 Bus. LAW. 119, 128-30
(1951). They are questioned in HONNOLD, CASES ON SALES AND SALES FINANCING
17-19 (2d ed. 1962). Whatever their unofficial weight as construction aids, clearly
"courts are free to disregard the comments since they are not part of the statutory
enactment and therefore are not law, and further, having been written after the Code,
they do not qualify as legislative history." Note, 43 B.U.L. REV. 396, 403 (1963).
18 Since the rule of subsection 2-316(1), reconciling conflicts between express
warranties and disclaimers, holds the latter "inoperative," a merger clause is essential
to neutralize oral warranties effectively. See UCC § 2-316, comment 2; Note, 38
IND. L.J. 648, 670 (1963). See generally section II(A) infra.
19 UCC § 2-202, quoted note 16 supra.
20o UCC § 2-202, comment 1(a) ; N.Y. CODE STUDY 598, 601.
UCC CONTRACT DRAFTSMANSHIP
terms consistent with those in their writing.2 ' Now freed from a binding
presumption of total integration,22 courts seem bound to seek the parties'
intent in extrinsic evidence tending to show alleged oral warranties sup-
plementary to the writing. Sellers should attempt to foreclose inquiry
beyond the writing by inserting merger clauses in their contracts.2 In a
recent Pennsylvania common pleas case 23 however, the parties scribbled a
brief contract for the sale of goods on the seller's usual repair service form.
The court disregarded the merger clause in the printed repair form and
held the seller bound by his oral representations. The case warns sellers
that the mere presence of a merger clause in a patently incomplete mem-
orandum may not forestall a court's examination of parol evidence to as-
certain the parties' negotiated understanding. But barring fraud, illegality,
or other potential infirmities that threaten all contract clauses, the merger
clause generally seems an ideal manifestation of the parties' mutual inten-
tion to restrict the contract to the terms in writing.25
2. Excluding Unfavorable Terms in the "Battle of Forms"
Frequently contracts are consummated by an exchange of forms be-
tween buyer and seller without personal negotiation, so that seller must
rely on the wording of his form to maneuver the terms he desires into the
contract.L2 6 The common law required that offer and acceptance match in
21 The Codes concept of "partial integration" may be difficult to apply, for "the
oral part must nearly always have some effect upon the interpretation, application,
and legal operation of the part that is in writing." Corbin, The Parol Evidence
Rule, 53 YALsE L.J. 603, 627 (1944). See also Note, 53 CoLum. L. REv. 858, 865-66
(1953); TEXAS CODE STUDY 285-86. See generally 9 WIGMORE, Ev-DENcE §2430
(3d ed. 1940).
Although courts operating under the Code must allow consistent additional terms
to supplement without contradicting the terms contained in the writing, they may
avail themselves of Corbin's thesis that partial integration is often a legal fiction.
The general rule of § 2-202 may be construed to presume no integration from the
existence of a writing, instead settling the question of integration by reference only
to the parties' intent. But see N.Y. CODE STUDY at 601.
22 See UCC § 2-202, comment 1(a).
23 See Cudahy, Limitation of Warranty Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
47 MARQ. L. REv. 127, 131-32 (1963).
24 Holland Furnace Co. v. Heidrich, 7 Pa. D. & C.2d 204 (C.P. Luzerne County
1956).
2 5 An "underlying policy" of the Code is to foster commercial practices inaugu-
rated by agreement. UCC § 1-102(2) (b); see Cudahy, sutpra note 23, at 136 n.34.
On the other hand, the Code generally disfavors disclaimers. See UCC §2-316.
Since the merger clause is a disclaimer of express oral warranty, see Note, 53 CoLum.
L. REv. 858, 870 (1953), the stigma may also attach to it. The 1952 version of
§ 2-316(1) did not clearly permit a writing to merge out oral representations. Com-
pare N.Y. CODE STUDY 406 with Note, 38 IND. L.J. 648, 668-70 (1963). But as
amended §2-316(1) is specifically subordinated to the parol evidence rule.
Merger clauses are ineffective to exclude implied warranties from the agreement.
Compare UCC §2-202 with UCC §2-316(2). See also Hobart Mfg. Co. v. Rod-
ziewicz, 125 Pa. Super. 240, 189 Atl. 580 (1937); Note, 43 B.U.L. Rxv. 396, 400-01
(1963) ; Note, 53 COLUm. L. REv. 858, 864 (1953).
26See generally FuLLER, BAsIc CONTRACT LAw 178-80 (1947).
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every particular before a contract was formed.2 7 The simplicity of the
common-law rule engendered a high degree of legal certainty and also
proved commercially workable, since agreements rarely failed because of
accidental discrepancies in technical clauses before the era of preprinted
forms.2 18 The recent widespread growth of negotiation by exchange of
forms, however, has emphasized the problem of such fatal variation.
29
Businessmen do not read all clauses of every standardized form, and they
may assume that clauses which are apparently included in the form to
deal with distinguishable transactions will not be enforced. 0 The prior
law might not have recognized any binding agreement even though the
parties had considered themselves commercially bound.31 The Code adapts
flexible legal rules to modern commercial reality 32 but unfortunately over-
reaches its purpose and undermines the certainty of the old law. Parties
may now be bound by terms that they thought they had successfully dis-
avowed by exchange of unlike forms. Only careful draftsmanship by both
parties will restrict contracts to mutually intended terms.
The seller's principal tactical problem in excluding unwanted terms is
his desire to disclaim warranties,3 usually those implied in sales transac-
tions generally, but occasionally express warranties contained in buyer's
order form. Subsection 2-207(1) embodies the general rule for determin-
ing when an enforceable agreement has been reached:
A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a writ-
ten confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates
as an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or
different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is
expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different
terms.
Despite the potentially broad reach of the statutory language,34 the official
comments suggest its application to only two typical minor discrepancies
27 F. W. Berk & Co. v. Derecktor, 301 N.Y. 110, 92 N.E.2d 914 (1950) ; Cohn v.
Penn Beverage Co., 313 Pa. 349, 352, 169 Atl. 768, 769 (1934) ; RESTATEMENT, CoN-
TRACTS § 60 (1932). An extreme example of the common-law position held that
seller's confirmation forms could not even state terms implied in buyer's order. See
Watts v. Thomas Carter & Sons, Inc., 207 App. Div. 656, 202 N.Y. Supp. 852 (1924).
2 8 Note, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 837, 853 (1957).
29 See TEXAS CODE STUD 40-41; 76 HAnv. L. Rzv. 1481, 1482 (1963).
3o See Note, 111 U. PA. L. Rzv. 1197, 1204 (1963).
3176 HAxv. L. REv. 1481, 1482 (1963).
3S UCC §§ 1-102(2) (a)-(b), 2-207, comment 2.
33 About a third of all sales litigation involves warranties allegedly made in the
contracts. HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES (UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE) 36 (1955).
-4 Although § 2-207(2) expressly regulates only the inclusion of proposed "addi-
tional" terms in contracts between merchants, subsection (1) also broadly encom-
passes exchanges of forms with "different" terms. Compare N.Y. CODE STUDY 628;
Note, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 837, 855 (1957) (suggesting limiting § 2-207 to discrepancies
between merchants' printed forms).
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between merchants' forms: the addition in written acknowledgments of
terms not discussed in informal agreements and the inclusion in confirma-
tions of "further minor suggestions or proposals" to facilitate the mechan-
ical operation of the transaction 3 5 Thus, if buyer ordered 200 dozen black
silk men's hose (long style), and if seller acknowledged the order but stated
it could only ship short style hose, courts operating under either the com-
mon law 6 or the Code 7 should hold that seller's response so deviated
from the offer that the parties reached neither commercial nor legal agree-
ment. But should a court applying the Code find that seller intended to
proceed with the transaction even though he proposed additional terms for
future negotiation, the Code would establish a binding contract despite the
discrepancies between the parties' forms.
38
The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition
to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of
the contract unless: . . .
(b) they materially alter it . . 3
A seller's confirmation of buyer's order that precisely duplicates buyer's
terms but adds a disclaimer of implied warranties would thus not satis-
factorily limit seller's warranty liability. The proposed addition of the
disclaimer would be a "material alteration" 40 that would not bind the
parties until the buyer expressly agreed to it.4 ' The contract therefore
would impose full implied warranty liability on the seller, unless buyer
happened to read the disclaimer clause in seller's form and expressly agreed
to it.4 In this fashion, the Code protects buyers from the "surprise and
hardship" of unexpected warranty disclaimers foisted upon them in the
routine exchange of forms.
3
The controversial decision of Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F. P. Bartlett & Co.,44
however, employed a different approach to give effect to seller's disclaimer.
The court reasoned that a literal application of the Code would have created
the "absurdity" that the exchange of forms had produced a binding contract
with implied warranties plus a proposal by the seller for the inclusion of a
disclaimer "unilaterally burdensome" upon the buyer.45 Preferring to
35 See UCC § 2-207, comment 1; N.Y. CODE STUDY 627.
36 See cases cited note 27 supra; N.Y. CODE STUDY 633.3 7 See 111 U. PA. L. REv. 132, 134 (1962).
38 See N.Y. CODE STUDY 633.
39 UCC § 2-207(2) (b). Subsections 2-207(2) (a) and (2) (c) permit buyer-
offeror to keep immaterial additions in seller-offeree's form out of the contract. The
offer may limit acceptance to the offer's stated terms under § 2-207 (2) (a), or the
offeror can subsequently object to unwanted immaterial additions under § 2-207 (2) (c).
40 See UCC § 2-207, comment 4. See generally TEXAS CODE STUDY at 41; N.Y.
CODE STUDY 633-34; Note, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 837, 862 (1957).
41 UCC § 2-207, comment 3. See also Phalan, Uniform Commercial Code-Sales
-Iadvertent Acceptance of Buyer's Terns, 62 DIcK. L. REv. 170, 172 (1958).4 2 See 76 HARv. L. REv. 1481, 1483 (1963).
43 UCC § 2-207, comment 4.
44297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962), 76 HARv. L. Rxv. 1481 (1963), 111 U. PA. L.
REv. 132 (1962).
45 297 F.2d at 500.
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hold that the presence of the disclaimer made the entire acceptance "ex-
pressly conditional" upon buyer's assent to the modified term under sub-
section 2-207(1),46 the court found that buyer's acceptance of the goods
manifested his assent to be bound by the terms in the confirmation, includ-
ing the implied warranty disclaimer.4 7 The Roto-Lith decision has been
criticized on several grounds. The court construed seller's confirmation
"expressly" to condition acceptance of the contract on buyer's assent to the
disclaimer, thus extinguishing the burden of clarity that the Code imposes
upon the merchant offeree who desires to qualify his acceptance.4 8 More-
over, the court uncritically dismissed any notion that for commercial or
other reasons a buyer might gratuitously submit to additional burdensome
terms.4 9 Even the court's basic assumption that the seller could not have
thought a contract consummated without the disclaimer has been doubtedP
Due to the weaknesses of the Roto-Lith decision, a confirming seller
cannot safely rely on an eventual judicial determination that by disclaiming
implied warranties he expressly conditions his acceptance upon buyer's
assent to this disclaimer. "Perhaps it would be wiser in all cases for an
offeree to say in so many words, 'I will not accept your offer until you
assent to the following . . . ,' "51 a procedure contemplated under sub-
section 2-207(1) to guarantee the offeree that no contract is formed until
the parties agree on all terms. If the seller adopts this precaution, what
conduct by buyer suffices to manifest his "assent" to seller's additional
terms and hence his acceptance of seller's counter-offer? An analogous
proposal-for material alteration of an otherwise binding agreement under
section 2-207(2)-has no binding effect unless "expressly agreed to by
the other party." 2  But the use of the word "assent" in the text of sub-
section (1) suggests something less than unequivocal, affirmative acts.
Inaction may therefore bind buyer to a proposal for material alteration
embodied in seller's acceptance, 53 if the seller expressly conditions his
acceptance upon conduct that reasonably denotes passive assent, such as
buyer's failure upon receipt of the conditional acceptance to object to
the added term.r5 By thus conditioning his acceptance, seller can con-
46Ibid. The court's circumvention of §2-207's plain meaning is criticized in
Note, 3 BOSTON COLLEGE: INIDUSTR.AL & CommacrAL. L. REv. 573, 574-75 (1962).
47297 F.2d at 500. The seller's confirmation contained the clause: "All goods
sold without warranties, express or implied . . . ." 297 F.2d at 498. This language
-a classic "general disclaimer"-was unquestionably insufficient to rid the contract
of implied warranties under the Code. See §2-316(2) & comment 1. However,
buyer's counsel did not dispute the effectiveness of the disclaiming language. 297
F.2d at 500. He may have assumed that the contract clause that "Buyer assumes
risk for results," 297 F.2d at 499, sufficiently brought the absence of implied warranty
liability to buyer's attention. See UCC § 2-316(3) (a).48 See 76 H.Rv. L. Rxv. 1481, 1483 (1963).
4) Ibid. (desire to maintain "mutual beneficial working relationship").
5O Ibid.
51297 F2d at 500 (dictum).
42See note 41 supra and accompanying text. See also UCC § 2-209(1) (con-
sideration not required to modify binding agreement).
53 The Code's draftsmen also used the word "assent" in the sense of passive
acceptance when referring to the inclusion of immaterial alterations in a binding
contract. UCC § 2-207, comment 6.
54 See 111 U. PA. L. REv. 132, 135 n.17 (1962).
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summate a contract on his terms and undermine section 2-207(2)'s pro-
tection of buyer from unwitting acceptance of material alterations. The
assumption underlying subsection 2-207(2), that buyers are unlikely to
read sellers' confirmations to discover material alterations,5 now works to
the seller's advantage, since buyer is equally unlikely to learn that by accept-
ing seller's goods or otherwise continuing the commercial relationship he
has accepted seller's disclaimer of implied warranties. However, buyers
unwilling to assume this burden can easily protect themselves against the
formation of a contract on altered terms by stipulating in their purchase
orders that acceptance is restricted to the terms of the offer.56
Despite the court's holding in Roto-Lith that seller had effectively
disclaimed by conditioning his acceptance on buyer's mere receipt of seller's
goods,57 other courts might find this an unjustified circumvention of section
2-207(2)'s protection of buyer. Only a few sellers seem commercially
able to avoid this risk. A stipulation in seller's confirmation conditioning
acceptance on buyer's affirmative communication of assent to seller's im-
plied warranty disclaimer would be feasible only if the goods need not be
immediately shipped and if the additional burden of response would not
unduly antagonize customers. 58 Moreover, until buyer assents affirma-
tively, neither party is contractually bound. If the seller elects to ship
without receiving buyer's affirmative assent, the buyer's acceptance of the
goods would establish a contract by conduct 59 without the implied warranty
disclaimer. According to subsection 2-207(3),
Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a con-
tract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the
writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract. In
such case the terms of the particular contract consist of those
terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with
any supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions
of this Act.
Even though the seller's attempted disclaimer conflicts with the implied
warranty and thus both warranty and disclaimer are excluded from the
area of written agreement, the implied warranty would reappear in the
transaction as a "supplementary term" supplied by the Code in transactions
generally.60 Consequently, since most sellers cannot readily obtain the
complete assurance of buyer's express assent to disclaimers of implied
warranty, they should expressly condition their acceptances on buyer's
5 See Note, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 837, 858 (1957).
6 See note 39 supra.
67 297 F2d at 500.
5 8 See FULLxR, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 179 (1947); Note, 105 U. PA. L. REV.
837, 857 (1957).
5
9 Under UCC § 2-201(3) (c) most unwritten contracts for over $500 are un-
enforceable until buyer receives and "accepts" the goods. In these cases subsection
2-207(3) could not effect an enforceable contract by conduct until buyer technically"accepts" by failing to reject after an opportunity to inspect the goods. UCC
§2-606(1) (b).
60 See UCC §2-314(1).
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failure to object to the additional warranty disclaimer within a reasonable
specified period and designate buyer's acceptance of the goods as equivalent
to their assent to the disclaimer. 61
Sellers should have less difficulty disclaiming express warranties that
the buyer's order form attempts to impose upon them, because express
warranties arise only by agreement or activity of the parties.62 The seller's
confirmation form containing a disclaimer of express warranty directly
contradicts the buyer's warranty term. If the conflict over the terms of
the express warranty is sufficiently basic to prevent the writings from
consummating a contract-as might be the case if the parties disagree on
the warranty of description 63-, the contract formed under subsection
2-207(3) by the seller's subsequent shipment and the buyer's acceptance
of the goods would exclude the express warranty, since the parties' writings
did not agree thereon and the Code does not supply it as a supplementary
term. Even if the disagreement over the scope of express warranty lia-
bility is relatively insignificant and does not prevent seller's acknowledg-
ment form from operating as an acceptance of buyer's offer, the seller still
could achieve the effect of disclaimer. The disclaimer of express warranties
is contradictory, and not "additional," to buyer's order. Therefore, even
though the buyer has not expressly agreed to the disclaimer, subsection
2-207(2), which purports to deal only with "additional terms," does not
apply to incorporate an express warranty into the contract. Rather, con-
flicting warranty and disclaimer should cancel each other, and the contract
should comprise only those terms upon which the parties agree.6 Since
express warranties, unlike implied warranties, do not benefit from a pre-
sumption that they are contained in all transactions to assure fundamental
fair dealing, courts have no reason to impose them upon a seller disclaim-
ing in good faith. Therefore, sellers probably can directly disclaim express
warranty without conditioning their entire acceptance upon buyer's agree-
ment to the disclaimer; they need not endure the uncertainty in commercial
relations deriving from the absence of a binding contract while awaiting
buyer's agreement to the disclaimer.
3. Restricting the Effect of Course of Dealing and Usage of Trade
Because parties usually contract without conscious reference to their
course of prior dealings 65 and trade usages, 66 they generally do not
6' Alternatively, UCC § 2-719(3) may permit sellers to limit consequential dam-
ages while remaining responsible for repair or replacements. See section III, infra.
2See UCC § 2-313(1).
63 See section II (A), infra.
64 See UCC § 2-207, comment 6.
65 "A course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct between the parties
to a particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common
basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct." UCC
§ 1-205(1).
66 "A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing having such regularity
of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation that it will
be observed with respect to the transaction in question." UCC § 1-205(2). See
generally Note, 55 CoLum. L. RExv. 1192 (1955).
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reduce these understandings to writing.67  Recognizing this characteristic
of commercial dealing, the great weight of authority has permitted introduc-
tion of trade usages 6s--and to a lesser extent, course of dealing 6 9-- to
explain the contract's written terms. In harmony with the Code's accom-
modation of law to business practice, 70 section 2-202 allows parol evidence
of both course of dealing and trade usage to explain or supplement the
written terms of even an integrated contract.71 Parties desiring to deviate
from their prior course of dealing or from usages of their trade must there-
fore take account of the new ease of establishing a practice as trade usage 71
and the contractual specificity now necessary to detach transactions from
their commercial setting.
The Code's concept of "course of dealing"-"a sequence of previous
conduct . . . which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common
basis of understanding" 73-- continues the meaning of the term under prior
law.74  Prior cases had held that neither a single transaction 75 nor a few
isolated acts 76 created a course of dealing. Parties who at the time of
contracting assumed continuation of their previous course of dealing, par-
ticularly the lax enforcement of contract terms,7 7 may no longer rely on
general contract clauses to nullify their prior practices. The Code imposes
a judicial duty to give meaning "wherever reasonable" not only to the
express contract provisions but also to the parties' course of dealing.
7
Parties desiring to keep course of dealing from influencing contract
interpretation should expressly reserve the right to literal compliance with
provisions, even if unenforced in prior transactions. Provident Trades-
67 See UCC § 2-202, comment 2; Nicoll v. Pittsvein Coal Co., 269 Fed. 968, 971
(2d Cir. 1920) (dictum).
I0 See, e.g., Dixon, Irmaos & Cia. v. Chase Natl Bank, 144 F.2d 759 (2d Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 850 (1945); Ermolieff v. R. K. 0. Radio Pictures, Inc.,
19 Cal. 2d 543, 550, 122 P.2d 3, 6 (1942) ; Electric Reduction Co. v. Colonial Steel
Co., 276 Pa. 181, 186-90, 120 Atl. 116, 118-20 (1923); McBaine, The Rule Against
Disturbing Plain Meaning of Writings, 31 CALIF. L. REV. 145, 158 & n.30 (1943);
Von,, SALEs § 9 (2d ed. 1959) ; 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2463, at 204 (3d ed. 1940).
6 See 9 WiGMoRn, EVIDENCE § 2463, at 206, § 2465, at 211-12 (3d ed. 1940).
70 See UCC § 1-102 (2) (b); Report of Committee on the Proposed Commercial
Code. 6 Bus. LAw. 119, 125-26 (1951).
"1 UCC § 2-202(a). The Code's parol evidence rule seems more liberal than its
common-law counterpart in allowing trade usage to supplement written terms. Com-
pare UCC § 2-202(a) with 9 WiGmORE, EVIDENCE § 2463, at 207 (3d ed. 1940).
72 See Erb v. Stoner, 19 Pa. D. & C.2d 25, 31 (C.P. Lancaster County 1958);
cf. Carpenters Union v. Riggs-Distler & Co., 73 N.J. Super. 253, 179 A.2d 564
(L. 1962).
73 UCC § 1-205(1).
74 See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Kepler, 116 F.2d 1, 6-7 (8th Cir. 1941) ; Koehler
v. Modem Bhd. of America, 160 Mich. 180, 125 N.W. 49 (1910).
75 See Sanders v. Chartrand, 158 Mo. 352, 362, 59 S.W. 95, 97 (1900); cf.
Warkentin v. Kleinwachter, 166 Okla. 218, 221, 27 P.2d 160, 163 (1933) (single
disreputable act is not "course of conduct!' within attorney disbarment statute).
76 See cases cited note 74 supra.
77 Ibid.
78 See UCC §§ 1-205(4)-(5), 2-208(2).
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mens Bank & Trust Co. v. Pemberton,79 the only "course of dealing" case
reported under the Code, demonstrates the specificity necessary in such a
provision. The plaintiff bank, which financed a car sale for the defendant
automobile dealer, failed to notify defendant before the car was wrecked
that insurance coverage had lapsed. The court held that the bank's prior
practice of always notifying the defendant upon lapse in insurance coverage,
according to the trade custom, had justified defendant's expectation of
notice in this case, despite defendant's waiver in the security agreement of
"all notices whatsoever in respect to this agreement." so Under pre-Code
law the parties' prior practice, though not expressly mentioned in the
written agreement, would have been excluded by this clause.81 Since
parties generally take their course of dealing for granted, however, the Code
interprets all contract provisions with reference to that conduct unless the
agreement specifically provides otherwise.8 2 Thus, the bank in the
Pemberton case erred in relying on a general, printed waiver of notice
clause, which might reasonably be construed as consistent with the bank's
settled practice of notifying defendant of lapses in insurance coverage by
applying the clause only to notices stipulated in the written agreement.8m
The clause should instead have expressly declared its dominance over this
pattern of prior dealings so that under no reasonable construction of the
contract could the parties' prior practice be given effect.
s4
The Code's definition of trade usage as a practice enjoying "such regu-
larity of observance . . . as to justify an expectation that it will be ob-
served with respect to the transaction in question" 85 encompasses more
commercial practices 8 6 than even the standards developed in cases liberal-
izing the classic common-law requirements that the custom be "ancient" 87
or "immemorial." 88 Moreover, the Code may bind the parties more readily
by this expanded concept of trade usage than did the prior law, 9 which
demanded that a party have at least reason to know that the trade usage
existed.90 Before the Code, distant sellers were held not bound by usages
79 196 Pa. Super. 180, 173 A.2d 780 (1961), affirming per curiam 24 Pa. D. &
C.2d 720 (Philadelphia County Ct. 1961).
80 24 Pa. D. & C.2d at 728.
81 See 5 WILLISTON, CONTRAcTS § 656 (Jaeger 3d ed. 1961) ; AsKE, CUSTOM AND
THE USAGES OF TRADE 206-09 (1909).
82 See UCC § 2-202, comment 2.
83 See 24 Pa. D. & C2d at 728. But see 196 Pa. Super. at 182, 173 A.2d at 781
(dissenting opinion).
84 UCC § 1-205 (4).
85 UCC § 1-205 (2).
8s See UCC § 1-205, comment 5.
87 See Everly v. Shannopin Coal Co., 139 Pa. Super. 165, 174, 11 A.2d 700, 705
(1940) ("so old, continued and uniform, as to be generally known").
88 See Knowles v. Dow, 22 N.H. 387, 403 (1851) (custom of more than twenty
years).
89 See MASS. GEN. LAwS ANN. ch. 106, §1-205(2) (1963) (annotations to
UCC); N.H. STATE BAR ASS'N, NEW HAMPSHIRE ANNOTATIONS TO THE PROPOSED
UNIFORM CommERC AL CODE, comment to subsection 1-205(2) (1959).
90 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 661, at 101 & n.1 (Jaeger 3d ed. 1961). See gen-
erally id. § 661.
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in their buyers' markets,9' nor by practices that had not existed long enough
for the seller to be expected to have had knowledge of them.9 2  But the
Code states that "an applicable usage of trade in the place where any part
of performance is to occur shall be used in interpreting the agreement as
to that part of the performance." 93  A literal reading of this statutory
language seems to charge sellers with knowledge of all customs in all distant
areas in which they deal, regardless of the reasonableness of their acquiring
this knowledge. Although the word "applicable" was inserted to remedy
the subsection's severity, 4 it may not have achieved the desired result, since
the trade usages "applicable" in interpreting agreements include, among
others, "any usage" in seller's vocation, without reference to seller's
awareness of i0 5
The risk of being unexpectedly bound by previously unknown customs
should impel sellers contractually to exclude this contingency by carefully
negating custom in express terms.90 However, since few, if any, contracts
are sufficiently detailed to operate without some supplementation by trade
usage, a negation of all trade usages would be commercially, if not judi-
cially, unacceptable. Hence, draftsmen should pinpoint specific trade
usages from which they intend to depart.
The Code also reverses the prior law in the minority of states which
required a contractual ambiguity before admitting evidence of trade usage
to contradict a term's plain meaning.97 If the parties now intend a term
not to connote its trade meaning, they must define it clearly. Although the
Code provides that express contract terms control inconsistent usages of
trade,98 trade usages also "give particular meaning to" the express con-
tract terms.99 Courts applying the Code can thus not advert to a trade
term's plain meaning to establish an inconsistency that will allow this
91 E.g., Lander Motors, Inc. v. Lee Tire & Rubber Co., 89 Ga. App. 194, 201,
78 S.E.2d 839, 844 (1953) ; Cowles v. Sgobel & Day, 105 Misc. 561, 563-64, 173 N.Y.
Supp. 752, 754 (App. Div. 1919); Western Star Mill Co. v. Burns, 305 P.2d 564,
568-71 (Okla. 1956).
92 Cowles v. Sgobel & Day, supra note 91.
03UCC § 1-205(5).
94 See EDrrORIAL BoARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 1956 RIcom EN-
DATIONS 17; HOGAN & PENNTEY, N.Y. ANNOTATIONS TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 17-18 (1961); N.Y. CODE STUDY 325-26.
95 UCC § 1-205(3).
96 See UCC § 2-202, comment 2. A mere statement that "all notices whatsoever
in respect to this agreement are hereby waived" may be insufficient to negate a notice
requirement imposed by custom. See Provident Tradesmen's Bank & Trust Co. v.
Pemberton, 196 Pa. Super. 180, 173 A.2d 780, affir-ming per curiam 24 Pa. D. & C.2d
720 (Philadelphia County Ct. 1961).
9 UCC § 2-202 & comment 1(c) ; see, e.g., Fort Pitt Malleable Iron Co. v. De-
troit Steel Prods. Co., 260 Mich. 683, 245 N.W. 546 (1932) ; Susquehanna Fertilizer
Co. v. Thomas H. White & Co., 66 Md. 444, 455, 7 Atl. 802, 804 (1887). See gen-
erally 9 WIGmORE, EvrmiTcE §§ 2461-65 (3d ed. 1940); McBaine, The Rule Against
Disturbing Plain Meaning of Writings, 31 CALIF. L. REv. 145 (1943).
98UCC §§ 1-205(4), 2-208(2).
99 UCC § 1-205 (3).
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ordinary literal meaning of the express terms to control. They must hold
that the parties intended their contract language to bear its usual commer-
cial meaning in the absence of a clear provision to the contrary.10
B. Preventing Postcontractual Alteration
1. The "No Oral Modification" Clause
Sellers under the Code should protect themselves against buyers'
spurious claims that additional oral warranties, or other promises, were
extended subsequent to consummation of the sales contract by stipulating
in the original writing that "This agreement cannot be modified except by
a writing signed by both of the parties." 101 The Code pressures sellers to
include this "no oral modification" clause by invalidating two previously
effective objections that sellers had interposed against claims that their
postcontractual representations created express warranty liability. The
abolition of the requirement of consideration for modification L02 now allows
gratuitous promises that mitigate buyer's obligation to bind the seller.
Sellers may also no longer defend against asserted postcontractual war-
ranties on the ground that buyer could not have relied on assurances given
by seller after the sale, 0 3 for the Code's express warranty definition ap-
parently abandons the previously necessary element of buyer's reliance on
seller's representations,'" and finds express warranty in "any affirmation
of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods
and becomes part of the basis of the bargain . . *.." 105 The indefinite
legal content of "basis of the bargain" 106 has induced perplexed com-
mentators to explain the phrase merely as a product of the Code's sweeping
revision of the Uniform Sales Act's phraseology, 1 7 so that buyer's reliance
remains a prerequisite to seller's express warranty liability as under the
prior law.'"8 Nevertheless, since the official comments imply that the
100 See UCC § 2-202, comment 2; accord, Nicoll v. Pittsvein Coal Co., 269 Fed.
968, 971 (2d Cir. 1920).
'0 1 See UCC § 2-209(2).
-102UCC §2-209(1); see TEXAS CODE STUDY 44. See also Patterson, An Apology
for Consideration, 58 COLUm. L. REV. 929, 937-38, 947 (1958).
103 Hogan, The Highways and Some of the Byways in the Sales and Bulk
Sales Articles of the Uniform Commercial Code, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 4 n.10 (1962).
104 "Definition of Express Warranty.-Any affirmation of fact or any promise
by the seller relating to the goods is an express warranty if the natural tendency of
such affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the
buyer purchases the goods relying thereon." UNiFo SALEs AcT § 12. (Emphasis
added.) See Maurice C. Smith Co. v. Fisher Plastics Corp., 76 F. Supp. 641, 642
(D. Mass. 1948) ; cf. UCC § 2-313, comment 3.
105 UCC § 2-313(1) (a). (Emphasis added.)
106 "Must one conclude that meaning other than reliance by the buyer must be
found since the Code rejects the reliance language of USA 12?" The question is
posed in HONNOLD, CASES ON SALES AND SALES FINANCING 36 (2d ed. 1962).
107 The comments to § 2-313 cite only § 12 of the Uniform Sales Act as the
"Prior Uniform Statutory Provision" and mention under "Changes" only the word "re-
written!' But see Note, 38 IND. L.J. 648, 650 (1963).
.08 N.Y. CODE STUDY 392; Note, 15 U. PITT. L. REv. 331, 335 (1954); cf. Note,
38 IND. L.J. 648, 650, 653 (1963).
[Vol.l12:564
UCC CONTRACT DRAFTSMANSHIP
parties can open up their agreement to include additional express war-
ranties as "part of the basis of the bargain," 109 the possibility of post-
contractual warranties in the absence of a "no oral modification" clause
cannot be discounted.
At common law at least sealed contracts had enjoyed substantial pro-
tection against oral modification,"' but eventually a rule evolved that no
self-imposed limitation upon subsequent modification of a written agree-
ment could diminish the parties' power to alter their undertakings."'
Thus, contract clauses prohibiting modification except by a signed writing
were utterly ineffective. To circumvent the rule that the more recent of
two enforceable agreements between the parties alters the former,1 2 the
legal import of the "no oral modification" clause would have had to tran-
scend the level of significance common to both written and oral agreements.
Statutes in some states have given these clauses transcending effect," 3 and
Code subsection 2-209(2) continues this statutory rule.1 4 "To prevent
entrapment of one party by a printed required-writing clause in the other
party's printed form," 115 however, the Code introduces a requirement that
buyers separately sign "no oral modification" clauses when merchant sellers
supply the forms, unless the transaction is "between merchants." 116 Since
the question of whether the buyer is a merchant may turn ultimately not
on his business knowledge, but on the purpose for which he purchases
the goods, 117 the seller should either inquire about the intended use of the
goods or, more simply, always insist upon separate signing of the "no oral
modification" clause in sales contracts if the goods are susceptible of
private as well as commercial use."
8
109 See UCC § 2-313, comment 7.
"0 Corbin, The Parol Evidence Rule, 53 YALE L.J. 603, 607 (1944).
111 Ibid.; accord, RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 407, comment a (1932).
112 See Corbin, supra note 110, at 607, 611, 618-19 n.31.
"3 See, e.g., N.Y. PRs. PROP. LAW § 33c(1) ; CAL. Cir. CODE § 1698 ("no oral
modification" clause in effect implied by law).
314 "A signed agreement which excludes modification or rescission except by a
signed writing cannot be otherwise modified or rescinded .... " UCC § 2-209(2).
315 N.Y. CODE STuDY 643.
"l6UCC §2-209(2). The California Bar Association has complained that the
separate signing requirement is "naive," that the buyer will pay no more attention
to where he puts his second signature than his first, and that the only effect will be
on sellers whose agents forget to make the buyer sign twice. See California State
Bar Assn. Committee on the Commercial Code, Report, 37 CALIF. S.B.J. 119, 146-47
(1962). Nevertheless, even the classical unwary buyer is more likely to peruse a
single provision that is forcefully brought to his attention.
117A contract "between merchants" is "any transaction with respect to which
both parties are chargeable with the knowledge or skill of merchants." UCC § 2-
104(3). (Emphasis added.) UCC § 2-104(1) & comment 2, however, provide that
for purposes of § 2-209 almost "any person in business" is a merchant, but only so
long as he is acting in his mercantile capacity. The Code may thus require separate
signing in sales to a businessman not acting in his mercantile capacity, because courts
may balk at holding that a sale was "between merchants" where one party was not
a "merchant!' within the meaning of the Code.
"is See P-H CoRP. Stov. f[25075, at 25459; note 117 supra.
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The contractual provision requiring that subsequent modifications be
signed by both parties reinstitutes some of the protection against unfounded
claims of postcontractual modification withdrawn from sellers by the Code's
amended Statute of Frauds.119 As under the old rule, not merely the
modification, but the "contract as modified" must satisfy the statute. 20
The Code, however, has relaxed the exclusionary effect of the classical
Statute of Frauds. "Between merchants," 121 the party to be charged no
longer has to sign the essential memorandum.122  Instead, if a written con-
firmation of an oral agreement is sufficient against the sender, subsection
2-201(2) also permits it to bind the recipient, unless he objects in writing
within ten days after its receipt.'2 3 A contractual requirement of dual sig-
natures on all modifications thus offers the seller even better protection than
the Statute of Frauds against modificatory language in forms routinely
exchanged to implement the transaction.
2. "No Waiver" Clauses
An unsuccessful attempt to modify a contract, or any "intentional
abandonment or relinquishment of a known right," 124 may waive otherwise
enforceable contract rights under the Code.125 Neither a "no oral modifica-
tion" clause nor the Statute of Frauds nullifies the nonpromissory aspects
of seller's attempted modification, 12 6 which may bind seller if the buyer
relying thereon materially changes his position. As a counter-move, sellers
may include in their sales forms "no waiver" clauses:
-19UCC § 2-201. Compare NEW YORE: LAw REvIsIoN Comm'N, HEARINGS
ON THE UNFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 163-64 (Legislative Doc. No. 65, 1954) (remarks
of Professor Llewellyn defending the Code's changes in the Statute of Frauds), with
Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HAxv.
L. REv. 561, 573-76 (1950) (attacking the innovations). See generally Note, 36
TEMP. L.Q. 75 (1962).
120 UCC § 2-209(3) ; accord, RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 223 (1932). The pro-
tection against parol modification afforded by §2-209(3), however, is largely under-
mined by the "waiver" notion embodied in § 2-209(4). See N.Y. CODE STUDY 644.
Under subsection (4) an attempted modification, even though invalid under the
Statute of Frauds, can still "operate as a waiver."
121 See UCC § 2-104(3) ; cf. note 117 supra.
122 UCC § 2-201 (2).
123 Ibid.; HAWKLAND, SALES AND BuLx SALES (UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL. CODE) 28-29 (1955).
124 N.Y. CODE STUDY 645, quoting Alsens Am. Portland Cement Works v. Degnon
Contracting Co., 222 N.Y. 34, 118 N.E. 210 (1917) ; see N.Y. CODE STUDY at 644-47.
25 UCC §2-209(4). "Since the section title includes 'waiver', the provision
might well be broad enough to include all waivers." N.Y. CODE STUDY 645. This
reliance upon the section title, clearly supported by UCC § 1-109 ("Section captions
are parts of this Act"), might be unavailable in those states, including Arkansas,
Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Jersey, which deleted section 1-109. Oregon
amended UCC § 1-109 by inserting the word "not." See UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-109 (1962). In these states, common-law waiver
may still be applicable. See UCC § 1-103.
12 UCC § 2-209, comment 4. But the distinction between UCC §§ 2-209 (2) -(3)
(subsequent modification) and UCC §2-209(4) (waiver) is easily blurred upon
application to actual facts. See Inwood Knitting Mill Co. v. Budge Mfg. Co., 29
Pa. D. & C.2d 462 (C.P. Philadelphia County 1962).
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Waiver by Seller of a breach by Buyer of any provisions of this
contract shall not be deemed a waiver of future compliance there-
with, and such provision, as well as other provisions hereunder,
shall remain in full force and effect.
These clauses may be ineffective due to their conflict with the policy
of subsection 2-209(5), providing that waivers can be retracted upon "rea-
sonable notification received by the other party" so long as the other
party is not done an injustice by having materially changed his position
in reliance upon the waiver. The contractual "no waiver" clause intends
the opposite result-failure to enforce a given contract provision does not
waive it and the temporarily unenforced provision remains in full effect
without notification of the waiver's retraction. Perhaps a "no waiver"
clause is a permissible contractual variation of the ordinary Code result. 2
7
But subsection 2-209(4) allows "waivers" to override contractual provi-
sions prohibiting oral modification, 28 and it seems contrary to the purposes
of that subsection to suppose that a "no waiver" term can prevent waivers
although a "no oral modification" clause cannot. Furthermore, whereas
subsection 2-209(2) specifically prevents a "no oral modification" clause
from being subsequently "modified" by parol, subsection (4) does not pro-
hibit the subsequent waiver of a "no waiver" clause. Hence, the buyer
might justifiably rely on successive instances of nonenforcement of sub-
stantive contract provisions to conclude that seller had also waived the "no
waiver" provision.'2 If the buyer has materially altered his position in
reliance upon a waiver, the seller could avoid the estoppel 1o effect of sub-
section (5) only by persuading the court that the "no waiver" provision
removed forever the buyer's reasonable right to rely on seller's conduct.
II. CLAUSES NEGATING WARRANTIES
A. Express Warranties
By forbidding virtually all disclaimers of description and of other
express warranties in the agreement,131 the Code reverses the prior law.
182
Since this rule is specifically subordinated to the parol evidence rule,133
sellers can generally cope with the Code's purported prohibition of dis-
claimers of express warranty by deleting unwanted promissory language
from the written agreement and inserting a merger clause. But they can-
not avoid liability from the goods' failure to conform to the express war-
127 See UCC § 1-102(3).
128 UCC § 2-209 (4) & comment 4.
129 See UCC § 2-208(3) & comment 3.
130 See UCC § 1-103; N.Y. CODE STuDY 644-45.
131 See UCC § 2-316(1).
132 Under non-Code law, "the easiest of all warranties to negate are those labelled
'express.'" Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society: II, 37 COLUm. L. REv.
341, 384 (1937).
133 UCC § 2-316(1) & comment 2.
1964]
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ranty embodied in the contract description'34 by deleting the description
clause, since contracts that do not designate their subject matter are
meaningless, 135 and perhaps even violative of the Statute of Frauds.
18 6
Therefore, sellers under the Code must precisely delimit description clauses
in the first instance without reliance on disclaimers.
Under the Uniform Sales Act, a "sale by description" 137 included an
implied warranty that the goods would be of the type described. 138 Never-
theless, the peculiarities of certain industries caused parties to assume that
sales were made without the implied warranty ordinarily generated by the
contract description of the goods.189 The Sales Act ' 40 and common law 141
permitted displacement of implied warranties by usage of trade, and the
Code retains that rule. 42  The Code, however, elevates the description
clause to the express warranty class,'43 thereby preventing future disclaimer
of this warranty by usage of trade. 44 Moreover, the possibility of dis-
134UCC §2-313(1) (b). Compare note 137 infra.
135 Omitting the description of the goods from the written contract would be
commercially unthinkable in most agreements. Even if it were attempted, it would
be futile under the Code, since a description that is "part of the basis of the bargain"
need not be made in words to create an express warranty. See UCC § 2-313(1) (b)
& comment 5. The parol evidence rule has never precluded admissibility of extrinsic
evidence regarding the subject matter of the contract. See McBaine, The Rule
Against Disturbing Plain Meaning of Writings, 31 CALIF. L. REV. 145, 159-62 (1943).
' 3 6 The quantity of goods sold is an element of the description, Haining Lumber
Co. v. Octavius Leon, Inc., 70 Ariz. 31, 215 P.2d 909 (1950), and even the Code's
relaxed Statute of Frauds requires that quantity of goods sold be stated in the memo-
randum, UCC §2-201(1).
137 In a "sale by description," identification of the goods depends upon their
description in the agreement. 1 WILISTON, SALES, § 224 (rev. ed. 1948). See gen-
erally id. at §§ 223-25.
13s UNIoRM SALES AcT § 14; see Anderson v. Thomas, 184 Kan. 240, 336 P.2d
821 (1959). The Code "reverts to the older case law" by reclassifying description
warranties as "express." UCC § 2-313, comment 1.
139 In the seed industry, for example, sellers cannot guarantee that the seeds
will produce plants conforming to the contract description, Cudahy, Limitation of
Warranty Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 47 MARQ. L. Rxv. 127, 134-35
(1963), and the implied description warranty has been generally held excluded by
usage of trade, Hoover v. Utah Nursery Co., 79 Utah 12, 7 P.2d 270 (1932) (alterna-
tive holding); Ross v. Northrup, King & Co., 156 Wis. 327, 144 N.W. 1124 (1914)
(alternative holding). But no disclaimer by trade usage applies if the seed delivered
differs completely from that described in the contract. Smith v. Will, 51 N.D. 357,
199 N.W. 861 (1924).
140 UNIFORM SALES AcT § 71.
141 Alex J. Mandl, Inc. v. San Roman, 170 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1948) (dictum);
Joannes Bros. v. Czarnikow-Rionda Co., 201 N.Y. Supp. 409, 121 Misc. 474 (1923).
142 UCC § 2-316(3) (c).
143 UCC §2-313(1) (b). The late Professor Llewellyn, the architect of article
two, was less concerned with logic in classifying description warranties than with
preventing disclaimer. See Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society: II, 37
CoLuM. L. REv. 341, 384, 386-87 (1937). Compare Alaska Pac. Salmon Co. v.
Reynolds Metals Co., 163 F.2d 643, 656-58 nn. 9-12 (2d Cir. 1947) (Frank, J.). The
Code's return to the original classification of description warranties as "express,"
coupled with the prohibition against disclaimer of express warranties in § 2-316(1),
marks the culmination of Professor Llewellyn's idea that the parties should not be
able to avoid description warranties by agreement.
144 Under the prior law, only implied warranties could be negated by usage of
trade. See UNIFORM SALES Acr § 71; India Paint & Lacquer Co. v. United Steel
Prods. Corp., 123 Cal. App. 2d 597, 613, 267 P.2d 408, 419 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954).
The Code does not suggest a contrary result. Compare Note, 15 U. PIr. L. REv.
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claiming descriptions and other express warranties by express contract
terms is purportedly prohibited by subsection 2-316(1) :
Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express war-
ranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty
shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each
other; but . . . negation or limitation is inoperative to the ex-
tent that such construction is unreasonable.
1 45
The description clause "300 bushels of Japanese onion sets" would
thus generate an express warranty despite a contract provision that "we
give no warranty, express or implied, as to any description . . . of any
seeds sent out." 146 Because description and disclaimer are inconsistent, a
court observing subsection 2-316(1) would hold that the seller expressly
warranted delivery of exactly 300 bushels of Japanese onion sets with no
impurity of the strains permitted. In the seed industry, however, sellers
traditionally have disclaimed description warranties, either by express con-
tract provision'147 or by usage of trade. 48 The Code rule would thus
overreach its purpose of protecting buyers against unfair surprise' 49 by
emasculating this bargained disclaimer or a similar disclaimer implied ac-
cording to accepted trade usage. A clause in the same contract stating that
delivery of a stipulated percentage of the quantity ordered would be deemed
compliance with the agreement'18 0 would also be inoperative under sub-
section 2-316(1) as an attempted limitation of the description warranty.151
Subsection 2-316(1) enables carefully drafted sales contracts to achieve
the effect of disclaimer of express warranty, however, by suggesting that
express warranties and limiting or disclaiming words or conduct may rea-
sonably be consistently construed.152 Possibly the two clauses might be
331, 348 (1954). Moreover, two Code provisions declare that express contract
terms "control" usages of trade. See UCC §§ 1-205(4), 2-208(2). Consequently,
the old rule against disclaimer of express warranties by usage of trade apparently
continues under the Code.
145 UCC §2-316(1). Commentators have dealt harshly with this subsection.
See Cudahy, Limitation of Warranty Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 47 MARQ.
L. Rxv. 127, 131 (1963) ("verbal miasma"); Ezer, The Impact of the Uniform
Commercial Code on the California Law of Sales Warranties, 8 U.C.L.A.L. Rxv.
281, 311 (1961) ("says nothing . . . means nothing"); Lorenson, The Uniform
Commercial Code Sales Article Compared With West Virginia Law, 64 W. VA. L.
Rxv. 142, 169-70 (1962) ("obscurity"); Note, 38 IND. L.J. 648, 666 (1963) ("seem-
ingly verbose and confusing mass of language").
146 The Code would overrule the decision of Lumbrazo v. Woodruff, 256 N.Y.
92, 175 N.E. 525 (1931), which held this disclaimer valid. See HOGAN & PENNEY,
N.Y. ANNOTATIONS TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 44-45 (1961); N.Y. CODE
STUDY 403-06.
147 Lumbrazo v. Woodruff, supra note 146.
148 See cases cited note 139 supra.
14) UCC § 2-316, comment 1.
150 Many contracts contain clauses such as "A variation of not more than 5tya
more or less than the total specified quantity contracted for shall be deemed com-
pliance with this contract"
151 See Haining Lumber Co. v. Octavius Leon, Inc., 70 Ariz. 31, 215 P.2d 909
(1950) (Uniform Sales Act).
152 See text accompanying note 145 supra.
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considered reasonably "consistent" if the disclaimer language "immediately
follows" the language of description, 15 thereby indicating the parties' full
awareness of the limitation on the description.'1  But so long as a court can
segregate words "relevant to the creation" of the warranty and give them
significance apart from the disclaimer, literal application of the statute re-
quires a holding that language "which otherwise would create an express
warranty shall not be denied effect by words of disclaimer." 155 Thus, a
seller's safest course is a frontal attack upon the words "relevant to the
creation" of the express warranty by making the words "tending to negate
or limit warranty" relevant to the description as well as to its disclaimer.
If the parties contracted for the delivery of "285-315 bushels of onion sets,
refined to the purest strain of the Japanese variety that seller is able to
supply," 1'6 a court would comply with the Code's letter and its spirit by
holding that all of these words constituted the "description."
The Code's sound policy reasons support the fine distinction that
differentiates words in a separate clause tending to negate or limit an express
warranty of description from those embodied in the "description" itself. A
separate disclaimer clause may not be negotiated,157 and often is inserted
inconspicuously 158 on the reverse preprinted side of an agreement,159 where
it is prone to be sweeping in its language 160 and is most likely to disad-
vantage the buyer by "unfair surprise." 161 Although the Code's new rule
may compel redrafting of agreements, it will force disclaimer-minded sellers
to avoid disclaimers and to bargain for restrictions upon potential express
warranty liability that they customarily foisted upon unwitting buyers.
Qualified description language may accomplish the parties' agreed purpose
by permitting the seller to satisfy his contractual obligation with a wide
range of goods. However, similar dilution of meaning is not a commercially
practical method of limiting the scope of other express warranties. If direct
153 Hogan, The Highways and Some of the Byways in the Sales and Bulk Sales
Articles of the Uniform Commercial Code, 48 CORNEL L.Q. 1, 7 (1962).
154 Cf. UCC § 2-313, comment 4.
155 N.Y. CODE STUDY 406 makes this argument under the 1952 version of
§2-316(1), which had merely provided: "If the agreement creates an express war-
ranty, words disclaiming it are inoperative." The argument that the presence of a
bargained disclaimer indicated that the agreement created no express warranty,
HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES (UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE) 47
(1955), seemed plausible under the 1952 statutory text, although it contradicted the
draftsmen's characterization of §2-316(1) as "prohibiting the disclaimer of express
warranties," UCC § 2-316, comment 1 (1952 OFFICIAL TEXT); see Note, 38 IND.
L.J. 648, 666 (1963). The position seems even less tenable under the revised sub-
section, which concerns itself only with consistency of language. See UCC §2-316(1)
& comment 1. UCC § 2-313, comment 4, suggests, however, that this literal con-
struction of §2-316(1) was not intended, and that bargained disclaimers may be
effective.
156 Compare the separate clauses of description and disclaimer in the text accom-
panying note 146 supra.
157 See HAwKLAND, supra note 155, at 47.
158 Cf. UCC § 2-316(2).
159 See, e.g., Lumbrazo v. Woodruff, 256 N.Y. 92, 175 N.E. 525 (1931).
160 Ibid.
161 See HAWKLAND, supra note 155, at 47.
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limitation of these express warranties would render them meaningless or
create contractual ambiguities that would be construed against the drafts-
man,1 62 sellers should eliminate them entirely from their sales forms.
B. Implied Warranties
1. Merchantability
Under the Code rules on disclaimer of the implied warranty of "mer-
chantability," 1'3 general disclaimers-such as "there are no warranties,
express or implied"-no longer relieve sellers of liability for implied war-
ranty.1 6 4 Merchantability embraces minimal quality standards drawn from
trade practice, the ordinary use of the goods, and the representations of the
label."" Unlike the Uniform Sales Act's warranty of merchantability, which
arose only in sales "by description," ' 68 the Code's merchantability warranty
extends to every contract of sale unless specifically disclaimed. 67 To ex-
clude or modify this implied warranty, subsection 2-316(2) requires that
the disclaimer mention merchantability 168 and, if in writing, be conspic-
162 See N.Y. CODE STUDY 407.
1 '"Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods
shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a mer-
chant with respect to goods of that kind." UCC § 2-314(1).
3
6 4 Willman v. American Motor Sales Co., 44 Erie L.J. 51, 56 (C.P. Erie County,
Pa., 1960) (the contract "must make plain that there is no warranty that their product
is reasonably suited for use as an automobile") ; Tumpson & Co. v. Castelli, 20 Beaver
L.J. 127 (C.P. Beaver County, Pa., 1958) ; Levitz Furniture Co. v. Fields, 6 Lebanon
L.J. 385 (C.P. Lebanon County, Pa., 1958); Holland Furnace Co. v. Jackson, 106
Pittsb. Leg. J. 341 (C.P. Allegheny County, Pa., 1958); Miller & Co. v. Gibbs, 6
Lebanon L.J. 344 (C.P. Lebanon County, Pa., 1958); L & N Sales Co. v. Little
Brown Jug, Inc., 12 Pa. D. & C.2d 469 (C.P. Philadelphia County 1957); Hartman
v. Green, 17 Somerset L.J. 134, 35 Washington L.J. 111 (C.P. Washington County,
Pa., 1954).
The uniformity in these decisions is significant because it conflicts with pre-Code
Pennsylvania precedent. See Traylor Eng'r & Mfg. Co. v. National Container Corp.,
45 Del. (6 Terry) 143, 149, 70 A2d 9, 12 (1949) (interpreting the Pennsylvania
law); cf. Shafer v. Reo Motors, Inc., 205 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1953) (express warranty
given "in lieu of all other Warranties expressed or implied and of all other obligations
or liabilities on . . . [seller's] part" held sufficient under Pennsylvania law to relieve
the seller of liability for negligence). Under the Code no contractual language is
effective to exclude liability for negligence. See UCC § 1-102(3).
16 UCC § 2-314 (2).
'66 UNF ona SALEs ACT § 15 (2) ; see Torpey v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 228 F.2d
117, 121 (8th Cir. 1955); Adams v. Peter Tramontin Motor Sales, Inc., 42 N.J.
Super. 313, 321-24, 126 A.2d 358, 362-64 (App. Div. 1956).
167UCC §2-314(1).
168 "Merchantability" under the Code connotes quality. However, it has his-
torically referred to "marketability" in real estate contracts, see Douglass v. Ransom,
205 Wis. 439, 237 N.W. 260 (1931), rather than to the quality of the land, see
Hocking v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 37 Cal. 2d 644, 234 P.2d 625 (1951). A similar
"saleability" connotation attached to the merchantability warranty in early chattel
sales. See Jones v. Just [1868] L.R. 3 Q.B. 197; Inter-State Grocery Co. v. Geo.
W. Bentley Co., 214 Mass, 227, 231, 101 N.E. 147, 149 (1913) ("This is not a war-
ranty of quality.") ; Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27
MiNN. L. REv. 117, 129-30 (1943). At least one court has used the words "mer-
chantability" and "marketability" interchangeably under the Code. See L. & N.
Sales Co. v. Stuski, 188 Pa. Super. 117, 146 A.2d 154 (1958).
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uous.169 The apparent purpose of these innovations was not only to limit
disclaimer to cases in which the parties dearly demonstrate the intent to
disclaim,170 but also to generate embarrassment and hesitancy among dis-
claiming sellers by requiring them to parade their lack of faith in their own
product before prospective buyers' eyes.' 71 Although disclaimers of the
implied warranty of merchantability need not be in writing, sellers would be
ill advised to rely on proof of parol disclaimers, which they could introduce
only by sacrificing a merger clause.172 In addition, juries sympathetic to
injured plaintiffs would undoubtedly suspect the credibility of sellers' dis-
claimer testimony.
Many sellers scatter disclaimers of various warranties throughout
their agreements. Thus, in one yarn contract,173 the seller in separate
clauses disavows responsibility for contamination, normal manufacturing
defects, poor color fastness, shade variation between dye batches, insuffi-
cient removal of oils, and vegetable material in animal fibers. In the
absence of disclaimer, these defects might render the yarn unmerchantable,
either under the minimum merchantability standards in subsection 2-314(2)
or by usage of trade.'7 4  If they are elements of merchantability,' 75 each
of these qualities would remain the seller's responsibility unless each dis-
claiming clause mentioned merchantability and was conspicuous. 176 The
following formula is preferable for disclaiming the implied warranty of
merchantability, as well as the implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose 177 and the statutory warranty of title: 178 "Except for the specifica-
tions and descriptions stated in this agreement, it is expressly agreed that
no warranty of merchantability, nor other warranty, express, implied, or
statutory, is made by the seller . . . ." Seller thus has confined his
embarrassment to one conspicuous paragraph mentioning merchantability.
169 "Language in the body of a form is 'conspicuous' if it is in larger or other
contrasting type or color." UCC § 1-201 (10). This definition is illustrative; the
real test is "whether attention can reasonably be expected to be called to it." UCC
§ 1-201, comment 10.
17o See Note, 49 Ky. LJ. 240, 253 (1960).
171 See HONNOLD, CASES ON SALES AND SALES FINANCING 112 (2d ed. 1962).
172 See Note, 38 IND. L.J. 648, 671-72 (1963). A merger clause, although suf-
ficient to exclude evidence of a parol disclaimer of implied warranties, does not also
exclude the implied warranties themselves. See note 25 supra; Jarnot v. Ford Motor
Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 429, 156 A.2d 568, 572 (1959) (dictum) ; Frigidinners, Inc.
v. Branchtown Gun Club, 176 Pa. Super. 643, 648, 109 A.2d 202, 204 (1954) (Uni-
form Sales Act).
173 J. P. Stevens Co., New York City, Yarn Sale Contract.
174 UCC § 2-314(3). Warranties could not be implied by usage of trade at com-
mon law, see Proctor v. Atlantic Fish Co., 208 Mass. 351, 94 N.E. 281 (1911)
(dictum), but the UNIFO M SALES AcT § 15(5) reversed this rule, ibid.
'75 The elements of merchantability enumerated in § 2-314(2) constitute a mini-
mum definition.
176 See UCC § 2-316(2).
'77 UCC § 2-315; see section II(B) (2) infra.
178 UCC § 2-312; see section II(C) infra.
179 See Note, 43 B.U.L. Rlv. 396, 399 (1963).
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Moreover, the comprehensive disclaiming language of this clause avoids
the danger of overlooking elements of merchantability in a list of specific
disclaimers.
Section 2-302 of the Code, 80 invalidating contract clauses found to
have been "unconscionable" at the time of contracting, permeates the Code's
specific provisions, including those treating disclaimers. The automobile
manufacturers' narrow warranty which effectively shielded these sellers
from implied warranty under prior law 18 1 now seems vulnerable. 8 2 In
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,183 a landmark case antedating New
Jersey's enactment of the Code, the New Jersey Supreme Court, rejecting
the technique of distorting contract language, squarely voided as uncon-
scionable a disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability in a
standard automobile purchase contract. 18 How heavily the court relied
upon the policy of Code section 2-302, which it cited,' 8 5 is mere speculation.
In a similar case,'8 6 in which the operative facts had also transpired before
the effective date of the Code, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts refused
to hold this disclaimer unconscionable, even though it disapproved the
harshness of the agreement.'8 7 However, the court suggested that section
2-316 might require a different result under the Code.' s8 Therefore, unless
the court actually intended to cite section 2-302 instead of section 2-316,
automobile manufacturers apparently can continue successfully to disclaim
merchantability in Massachusetts merely by mentioning it in conspicuous
clauses. Interestingly, although the caption "Dealer Warranty" is now
180 If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract
without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
UCC §2-302(1). Controversy has arisen over the Code's meaning of "unconscion-
able." All ten of the cases cited in the comments as "illustrating" the "underlying
basis" of § 2-302 seem, rather, to illustrate the effect of other sections of the Code.
See HoNNol), CASES ON SALES AND SALES FINANCING 27 (2d ed. 1962). The com-
ments themselves are "inherently contradictory," Note, 43 B.U.L. Rxv. 396, 403
(1963), in stating first that the "basic test" is whether the contract is too one-sided,
and then that "the principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise
. . . and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining
power. UCC § 2-302, comment 1. The confusion can be traced to a shift of em-
phasis in the earliest drafts of the Code. See 6 Bus. LAw. 146, 184-85 (1951).
81 E.g., Shafer v. Reo Motors, Inc., 205 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1953) (no liability
for negligence) ; Hall v. Everett Motors, Inc., 340 Mass. 430, 432, 165 N.E.2d 107,
109 (1960) ("no warranty whatsoever" except for replacement of defective parts) ;
Broderick Haulage, Inc. v. Mack-Int'l Motor Truck Corp., 1 App. Div. 2d 649, 153
N.Y.S.2d 127, appeal dismissed, 2 N.Y.2d 1011, 163 N.Y.S.2d 619, 143 N.E.2d 352
(1957) (no implied warranty of fitness).
182 See Hall v. Everett Motors, supra note 181, at 432, 165 N.E.2d at 109
(dictum); TEXAS CODE STUDY 287-88.
183 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
184 See Cudahy, Limitation of Warranty Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
47 MARg. L. REv. 127, 143 (1963) ; 14 RUTGERS L. REv. 829, 834 & n.34 (1960).
185 See 32 N.J. at 404, 161 A.2d at 95 (dictum).
186 Hall v. Everett Motors, Inc., 340 Mass. 430, 165 N.E.2d 107 (1960).
187 Id. at 432, 165 N.E.2d at 109 (dictum).
188 Ibid.
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printed in bold face capital letters in the Ford Motor Company contract
form, the language disclaiming merchantability is not. 89 Inasmuch as
subsection 2-316(2) requires that the disclaiming language itself be con-
spicuous, Ford Motor Company may be consciously risking invalidation
of this disclaimer to avoid consumer antagonism.190 Even if the Ford dis-
claimer should be upheld under subsection 2-316(2), however, the uncon-
scionability principle in section 2-302 continues to threaten. Henningsen,
of course, is less likely to portend the unconscionability of disclaimers in
nonadhesion contracts in sales of nondangerous goods. 1 Nevertheless,
the attitude adopted by the Massachusetts and New Jersey courts may
herald an era of unprecedented judicial disdain for all disclaimers by courts
operating under the Code. Sellers desiring to limit potential liability would
then have to develop their second line of defense-limitation of damages
and remedies in the event of warranty breach.
92
2. Fitness
The Code has also expanded the scope of the implied warranty that
the goods will be fit for the particular purpose contemplated by the buyer.
Under the prior law,1' 3 if the buyer actually relied on the seller's superior
knowledge to furnish appropriate goods after apprising the seller of a par-
ticular use intended for the goods, courts implied a warranty that the goods
would be reasonably suitable for the intended purpose.' 4 Code section
2-315 115 effects several changes in phraseology from the Uniform Sales
189 See the Ford Motor Co.'s "Retail Buyer's Order" (Form F-845 M, revised
12-60), in HONNOLD, CASES ON SALES AND SALES FiNANCING (2d ed. Supp. 1962,
at 426-29).
1
9 0 The contracts of Chrysler and General Motors continue to adhere to pre-
Code general disclaimer language. See HoNoLD, CASES ON SALES AND SALES
FINANCING (2d ed. Supp. 1962, at 422-25, 430-33). Failure of these business leaders
to respond to the Code's obvious change cannot be attributed to inertia. At least
these two manufacturers, apparently fearing that consumers read the "conspicuous"
terms in the agreement, must desire to avoid adverse reaction to the required promi-
nence of any disclaimer of fundamental quality guarantees. See text accompanying
note 171 supra.
19' See 14 RUTGERS L. REv. 829, 835 (1960).
112 Note, 43 B.U.L. REv. 396, 404-07 (1963) ; Note, 38 IND. LJ. 648, 674 (1963);
see section III infra.
193 Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller
the particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears that
the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment (whether he be the grower
or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be
reasonably fit for such purpose.
UNIFORM SALES Acr § 15(1).
'94 Odell v. Frueh, 146 Cal. App. 2d 504, 509, 304 P2d 45, 49 (Dist. Ct. App.
1956) ; Lindsey v. Stalder, 120 Colo. 58, 63, 208 P.2d 83, 86 (1949) ; Wright v. Gen-
eral Carbonic Co., 271 Pa. 332, 336-37, 114 Atl. 517, 518 (1921).
195 Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any
particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is
relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods,
there is unless excluded or modified under the next section an implied war-
ranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
UCC § 2-315.
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Act, any one of which may serve as a touchstone for judicial expansion of
the scope of the fitness warranty. By conditioning the warranty on
seller's "reason to know" of buyer's reliance, the Code may have reduced
the buyer's burden under the Uniform Sales Act to acquaint seller with
the purpose intended for the goods.' 96 The Code's position that the fitness
warranty may arise if goods are intended for "any particular purpose" could
also substantially extend seller's liability, at least before courts that had
formerly not implied a fitness warranty unless the "particular" purpose
differed from the goods' "ordinary" purpose. 197 In view of the broad
meaning the Code gives "merchantability," 198 however, courts should rely
upon that warranty, rather than on an expanded fitness warranty that en-
compasses ordinary as well as special uses of the goods.' 99 Furthermore, if
the seller assures the buyer that the goods are suitable for the intended
purpose, the Code's warranty of fitness, unlike that of the Sales Act, ° may
attach even though the buyer asks for the goods by their trade name and
thereby tends to indicate his lack of reliance on seller's representations. 2°1
Because of the expansion of this warranty, sellers should give greater
attention to its contractual exclusion. Disclaimers of the implied warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose need not be "specific," 2 02 but the Code
does require that they be in writing 2 03 and be conspicuous. 20 4 The example
given in the text of the statute---"There are no warranties which extend
196 See Note, 49 Ky. L.J. 240, 247 (1960); N.Y. CODE STuDY 401-02. The
Code's modification of the warranty's standard from "reasonably fit for such purpose"
to merely "fit for such purpose" should have little practical effect, since courts will
probably read the word "reasonably" into the Code. Cf. Note, 38 IND. L.J. 648, 662
(1963). See also Note, 49 Ky. L.J. 240, 248 (1960) (reliance on seller to "select
or furnish" goods may expand the warranty's scope).
197 Under the prior law courts disagreed as to whether the "particular" purpose
had to differ from the goods' ordinary use. Compare Zesch v. Abrasive Co., 353
Mo. 558, 564, 183 S.W.2d 140, 143 (1944), and State ex rel. Jones Store Co. v.
Shain, 352 Mo. 630, 179 S.W.2d 19 (1944), and Meyer v. Packard Cleveland Motor
Co., 106 Ohio St. 328, 140 N.E. 118 (1922), wizth Minneapolis Steel & Mach. Co. v.
Casey Land Agency, 51 N.D. 832, 839-40, 201 N.W. 172, 175 (1924), and Keenan v.
Cherry & Webb, 47 R.I. 125, 129, 131 Ati. 309, 311 (1925). See also N.Y. CODE
STUDY 402 n.88; Note 38 IND. L.J. 648, 662 n.78 (1963).
198 See UCC § 2-314(2), especially subclause (2) (c).
199 See N.Y. CODE STuDY 402 n.88.
200 UiFoim SALEs Act § 15(4).
201 See UCC § 2-315, comment 5; Note, 38 IND. L.J. 648, 662-63 (1963). The
strict construction of the Sales Act's "trade name" exception may have reduced the
significance of its omission in the Code. See Pa. Bar Assn. Note to §2-315, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-315 (1954).
202 UCC § 2-316(2) & comment 4. In the Code's 1952 draft, § 2-316(2) required
disclaimer of the fitness warranty to be "specific." Because of the recent relaxation
of this requirement, see EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNFOuRm COMMERcIAL CODE, 1956
REcOMMENDATiONs 39-40, early Pennsylvania Code cases demanding "specific" dis-
claimers are no longer precedent E.g., Holland Furnace Co. v. Jackson, 106 Pittsb.
Leg. J. 341 (C.P. Allegheny County, Pa., 1958); L & N Sales Co. v. Little Brown
Jug, Inc., 12 Pa. D. & C.2d 469 (C.P. Philadelphia County 1957).
203 UCC § 2-316(2). No similar requirement exists for merchantability dis-
claimers, ibid., and no reason is given for the discrepancy.
204 UCC § 2-316(2) & comment 4.
19641
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beyond the description on the face hereof"-will necessarily suffice.
Whether this language warns the buyer any more than the disfavored gen-
eral disclaimer 205 is doubtful, and either seems sufficient. 20 6 If seller's
disclaimer of the fitness warranty should fail to satisfy the Code's require-
ments, he may yet establish that a necessary element of the warranty, buyer's
reliance, never existed because buyer actually knew of seller's parol or
inconspicuous written disclaimer.2
7
In practice, the fitness warranty may straddle the boundary between
express and implied warranties. 208 If the seller has reason to know buyer's
particular purpose and his reliance upon seller's superior skill, an implied
warranty of fitness is created.2°9 If the seller also expresses the goods'
suitability for the particular purpose, the Code raises an express war-
ranty.2 10 Whereas under the prior law an inconsistent express warranty
would displace the implied warranty of fitness,211 Code section 2-317(c)
destroys this displacing power of the express warranty.212 Because un-
specific language does disclaim the fitness warranty, however, a perplexing
question of construction emerges. Is a clause such as, "The seller warrants
only that the goods are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods
are generally used," an express warranty which, though inconsistent with
the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, fails to displace it
under the rule of subsection 2-317(c)? Or does the clause successfully
disclaim the implied warranty under subsection 2-316(2) ? 213 The lan-
guage "The seller warrants only" is cast in express warranty form, but
pre-Code courts have characterized similar phraseology also as a dis-
claimer,2 14 and single clauses frequently have served the dual functions of
"limited express warranty" and "disclaimer." 215 Although the Code allows
unspecific disclaimer of the fitness warranty, a court might invalidate the
disclaimer in this hybrid clause as too elliptical to avoid unfairly surprising
buyers 21 6 Since words like "the only warranty" closely resemble the lan-
guage "relevant to the creation of an express warranty," 2 1 7 they may be
205 "There are no warranties, express or implied." See UCC § 2-316, comment 1.
206 To realize the Code's protection against misleading disclaimers of the fitness
warranty, buyers apparently must rely solely on the requirement of § 2-316(2) that
disclaimers be conspicuous. Cudahy, Limitation of Warranty Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 47 MARQ. L. Rxv. 127, 138 (1963).
207 See UCC § 2-316, comment 5.
208 See Note, 38 IND. L.J. 648, 663 (1963).
209 UCC § 2-315.
210 UCC § 2-313 (1) (a).
2 1 1 UNIFORM SALES AcT § 15(6); see, e.g., Rasmus v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 158
F. Supp. 70, 90-93 (N.D. Iowa 1958); Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Mahon, 13 N.D. 516,
101 N.W. 903 (1904).
212 "Express warranties displace inconsistent implied warranties other than an
an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose." UCC § 2-317(c).
213 See text accompanying notes 202-04 supra.
214 See Rasmus v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 158 F. Supp. 70, 92-93 (N.D. Iowa 1958);
Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Mahon, 13 N.D. 516, 101 NAV. 903 (1904).
215 See Rasmus v. A. 0. Smith Corp., .npra note 214, at 92 (discussing the
problems confronting draftsmen before the UCC).
216 See UCC § 2-316, comment 1.
217 See UCC §2-316(1).
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inadequate to disclaim the fitness warranty under section 2-317(c). There-
fore, after whatever express warranty seller desires to insert into his con-
tract, he should add a conspicuous disclaimer, such as: "Except for the
above express warranty, there are no warranties, including any implied
warranty of merchantability, which extend beyond the description on the
face hereof." 218
3. Alternatives to Disclaimers
Code section 2-316(3) offers sellers three alternatives to disclaimer
for the exclusion of implied warranties from sales agreements.219 Each
of these devices modifies the prior law.
Subsection 2-316(3) (b) provides:
when the buyer before entering into the contract has examined
the goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired or
has refused to examine the goods there is no implied warranty
with regard to defects which an examination ought in the cir-
cumstances to have revealed to him ....
The subsection's language of "refusal" imports not only that the buyer be
given an opportunity to inspect, but also that the seller "demand" that the
buyer examine.2 0  The Code thus provides an added protection for the
classical disinterested buyer by excluding the warranty as to defects dis-
coverable by examination only if seller actively prods his customer into
either actual examination or "refusal." 221 In order to vitiate the implied
warranty, the inspection or refusal to inspect must precede the making
of the contract. A clause in the seller's form stating that "Seller has
demanded examination and buyer has examined the goods as fully as he
has desired or hereby waives his failure to do so" might exclude the
implied warranty.222 But a court could properly ignore this clause unless
assured by its prominence in the form or by its separate signing that the
buyer actually considered it. Moreover, the clause would appear to be a
218 See UCC § 2-316 (2).
219 The "displacement!' method provided in UCC § 2-317(c), see note 212 tupra,
will not aid sellers who wish to absolve themselves from all warranty responsibility,
since an inconsistent express warranty itself bears potential liability and can never
displace the implied warranty of fitness.
220 UCC § 2-316, comment 8. UNIFORm SALES AcT § 15(3), excluding implied
warranties "if the buyer has examined the goods," negated warranty if the seller
merely provided the buyer an opportunity for inspection. See, e.g., Dunbar Bros. v.
Consolidated Iron-Steel Mfg. Co., 23 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1928); Bansbach v. Allied
Mach. & Welding Co., 334 Ill. App. 76, 78 N.E.2d 344 (1948) ; McCormick v. Hoyt,
53 Wash. 2d 338, 333 P.2d 639 (1959) (buyer was given key to storage area to
examine goods "at his leisure").
221 The latency of the defect, the opportunity for testing, and the buyer's pro-
fessional skill are the principal factors considered in determining the scope of defects
excludable by examination. UCC § 2-316, comment 8.
222 See Kalodis v. Mayo Motors, Inc., 30 Lehigh LJ. 296 (C.P. Lehigh County,
Pa., 1963).
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subterfuge unless the surrounding circumstances would in fact have
permitted careful examination by the buyer.2
Subsection 2-316(3) (c) 2 also allows course of dealing and usage of
trade to defeat implied warranties. Although this subsection appears
merely to paraphrase Section 71 of the Uniform Sales Act,2 2 5 the enhanced
force of custom in the Code 226 should increase its use.
The third alternative to disclaimer is subsection (3) (a):
unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied war-
ranties are excluded by expressions like "as is", "with all faults"
or other language which in common understanding calls the
buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain
that there is no implied warranty .. . 27
Surprisingly, subsection (3) (a) does not require the "as is" language to
be conspicuous. 228 The Code's phrase "language which in common under-
standing calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and
makes plain that there is no implied warranty" most reasonably refers to
the connotation of the contract language rather than its relative prominence
in the agreement.229  Thus, sellers desiring to minimize their implied
223 Neither § 2-316(3) (b) nor its official comments treat the possibility that
compliance with seller's demand for examination might so burden the buyer that
characterization of his failure to examine as a "refusal" would be unfair. The prior
law, therefore, seems relevant. UCC § 1-103. Pre-Code law did not excuse failure
to examine on grounds of inconvenience or labor. Salzman v. Maldaver, 315 Mich.
403, 415, 24 N.W.2d 161, 166 (1946) ; McCormick v. Hoyt, 53 Wash. 2d 338, 342-43,
333 P.2d 639, 642 (1959). Refusal to examine was excused, however, "where the
examination at the time of the sale is, morally speaking, impracticable." 2 MECHEM,
SALEs § 1312 (1901). The Code's pervasive good faith requirement refines this
"morally impracticable" criterion to "observance of reasonable commercial standards
of fair dealing in the trade." UCC § 2-103(1) (b).
224 "An implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by course of dealing
or course of performance or usage of trade." UCC § 2-316(3) (c).
225 Variation of Implied Obligations.-Where any right, duty or liability
would arise under a contract to sell or a sale by implication of law, it may
be negatived or varied . . . by the course of dealing between the parties,
or by custom ....
UNIFORM SALES ACT § 71.
226 See section I(A) (3) supra.
227 UCC § 2-316, comment 7, classifies subsection (3) (a) as a mere "particu-
larization" of subsection (3) (c), providing for exclusion of implied warranties by
usage of trade. Subsection (3) (a) may go beyond subsection (3) (c), however, in
allowing "with all faults" language to exclude implied warranties in sales to con-
sumers and in industries in which disclaimer by trade usage has not been customary.
See N.Y. CODE STUDY 409; Note, 38 IND. L.J. 648, 673 (1963).
228 Compare UCC § 2-316(3) (a) with UCC § 2-316(2). The modes of warranty
exclusion in subsection (3) are clearly effective without regard to implications arising
from subsection (2). Subsection (2) begins, "Subject to subsection (3) . . . " and
subsection (3) begins, "Notwithstanding subsection (2) . . . ." See also STEIN-
HEIMER, MICHIGAN SALEs LAW AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 67-68 (1962).
As in the case of "merchantability," the Code allows sellers to recite "as is"
orally, but this would be strategically unsound. See text accompanying note 172 supra.
229 The "as is" language in UCC § 2-316(3) (a) is designed to encompass "factual
situations . . . surrounding the transaction," see UCC § 2-316 (3) (a) & comment 6,
but it seems more closely related to disclaimers. However, in view of the mutually
UCC CONTRACT DRAFTSMANSHIP
warranty liability without detracting from the saleability of their product
by conspicuous disclaimers might include an inconspicuous "as is" clause
in the body of their sales forms.23 0 However, subsection (2), which
focuses on protecting unwary buyers from unfair surprise, is "robbed of
much of its effectiveness" by the absence of similar safeguards in the
express terms of subsection (3). M  Although courts will probably not
interpret the two subsections together,2 32 the safest course for sellers em-
ploying this alternative to direct disclaimer of implied warranties would
be to position their "as is" language as conspicuously as is commercially
feasible-if possible, within the description itself.
C. The Warranty of Title
The enhanced "negotiability" of chattels under the Code increases the
likelihood that a seller who is not the property's absolute owner can
convey an indefeasible title.23 The incidence of breach of the title
warranty,'2 4 however, is not correspondingly reduced. Under Code
subsection 2-312(1)(a) the seller warrants both that he conveyed good
title and that its transfer was rightful, "so that . . . [buyer] will not
be exposed to a lawsuit in order to protect it." 2 3 ' Therefore, even though
excluding introductory clauses to subsections (2), containing a requirement of "con-
spicuousness" for disclaimers of implied warranty, and (3) of § 2-316, a court could
not hold that "as is" language must be conspicuous unless it ignored the Code's obvious
meaning.
230 Note, 38 IND. L.J. 648, 674 (1963). Non-Code courts generally sanctioned
this procedure. See, e.g., Paxton-Mitchell Co. v. United States, 145 Ct. Cl. 502, 172
F. Supp. 463 (1959) (U.S. government sales contract); Industrial Rayon Corp. v.
Clifton Yarn Mills, Inc., 310 Pa. 322, 324-25, 165 AtI. 385, 386-87 (1933) ("as is"
clause in body of letter of acceptance) ; Pokrajac v. Wade Motors, Inc., 266 Wis.
398, 402, 63 N.W.2d 720, 722 (1954).
231 See STEINHEIMER, MICHIGAN SALEs LAW AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 67 & n.13 (1962).
232 See note 229 mipra.
2-3 A seller can now transfer good title even though his own title was fraudulently
acquired. UCC § 2-403(1); see Note, 38 IND. L.J. 675, 686-88 (1963). Moreover,
"any entrusting of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind" now em-
powers the merchant to convey good title to a "buyer in ordinary course of business."
UCC §§2-403(2), 1-201(9). The latter rule reverses the prior law that merely
entrusting the proverbial watch to the jeweler for repair did not empower the jeweler
to transfer title. Compare UCC § 2-403(2) with Zendman v. Harry Winston, Inc.,
305 N.Y. 180, 186-87, 111 N.E.2d 871, 875 (1953), and Utica Trust & Deposit Co. v.
Decker, 244 N.Y. 340, 348, 155 N.E. 665, 667 (1927). But see McKee v. Peterson,
29 Cal. Rptr. 742, 745-46 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (dictum).
234 [T]here is in a contract for sale a warranty by the seller that
(a) the title conveyed shall be good, and its transfer rightful; and
(b) the goods shall be delivered free from any security interest or
other lien or encumbrance of which the buyer at the time of
contracting has no knowledge.
UCC § 2-312(1).
25 UCC § 2-312, comment 1. At common law, the original owner's suit against
the buyer was alone insufficient disturbance of possession to support a breach of title
warranty action against the seller. Close v. Crossland, 47 Minn. 500, 50 N.W. 694
(1891). Rather, the requisite disturbance of possession entailed involuntary loss of
the property or payment of a money judgment. Johnson v. Oehmig, 95 Ala. 189,
10 So. 430 (1892); Krumbhaar v. Birch, 83 Pa. 426 (1877). Section 13 of the
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buyer might prevail in the original owner's suit contesting buyer's title,
buyer seems entitled to recover reasonable costs of the litigation occasioned
by seller's wrongful transfer under the title warranty.23 6 Although the
warranty of title under subsection 2-312(1) (a) may thus be breached
despite the buyer's indefeasible title, the warranty under subsection (b) 27
is more limited, since it requires the seller to deliver the goods free only
from encumbrances or security interests unknown to the buyer. Subsection
9-307(1) allows the buyer to take indefeasible title against even per-
fected security interests if he actually knows 23 8 that the security interest
exists but not that transfer of the property violated it.239 Yet, if the lienor
should sue, the buyer's knowledge of the lien disqualifies him from the title
warranty protection of subsection (b), including recovery of litigation
costs. Furthermore, a court would improperly expand the Code's title
warranty in this situation if it imposed liability under (a) on the theory
that transfer of title in violation of a security interest known to the buyer
was not rightful. Subsection (a), which does not distinguish between title
defects known and unknown to buyer, would then also obligate seller to
warrant against security interests unknown to buyer. However, this is the
exact warranty afforded by subsection (b), which this construction would
transform into surplusage. The warranty of quiet possession 240 against
security interest holders therefore seems restricted to encumbrances
unknown to the buyer at the time of contracting, although the warranty
against other title defects attaches regardless of whether buyer knows they
exist. Consequently, sellers of possibly encumbered goods may guard
against title warranty liability to a sued buyer 2 41 for wrongful transfer of
a security interest by disclosing only the existence of the security interest.
Nevertheless, seller's more comprehensive and more easily supportable
protection is direct disclaimer of the entire title warranty. The title
warranty was not excludable by a general disclaimer under the Uniform
Uniform Sales Act altered the common-law rule. 1 WILLIST N, SALES § 221, at 569
(rev. ed. 1948) (action to compensate for defective title permitted before disturbance
of possession). But see McGinn v. Connolly, 6 Pa. D. & C.2d 383, 389 (C.P. Phila-
delphia County 1955) (dictum) (actual disturbance of possession still required).236 Cf. UCC § 2-312, comment 1. The prior law allowed such damages only to
a buyer who had been dispossessed. 3 WILLISTON, SALES § 615, at 385 & n.11 (rev.
ed. 1948).
237 See note 234 supra.
238 "Knowledge" was given a belated statutory definition of "actual knowledge"
in the 1957 Official Text. UCC § 1-201(25) (1957 Official Text). Compare UCC
§ 2-312, comment 1 (1952 Official Text).
239 See UCC §§ 9-307(1), 1-201(9).
240 The guarantee of "quiet possession" was a warranty in itself under UNIFORM
SALES ACT § 13(2). Instead the Code makes disturbance of quiet possession one
of the ways in which the title warranty can be breached. UCC § 2-312, comment 1.241 Apparently, the Code's draftsmen discounted the likelihood that a lawsuit
would even be brought. UCC § 2-403, comment 2, broadly states in defense of the
Code's enhanced "negotiability of chattels" rules that "consignors have no reason to
complain, nor have lenders who hold a security interest in the inventory, since the
very purpose of goods in inventory is to be turned into cash by sale." Harry
Winston, however, "complained" considerably when Brand sold his diamond to Mrs.
Zendrnan and went bankrupt before remitting the proceeds. Zendman v. Harry
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Sales Act 22 despite its classification as "implied." 24 The 1952 draft of
the Code did not expressly classify the title warranty, and the logical
inference that the Sales Act's "implied" classification continued would
have allowed exclusion of the title warranty by "as is" language, which
can negate all implied warranties.244 This unintended possibility that
language connoting quality standards might disclaim seller's title liability '45
was not officially rectified until 1957, when the warranty was expressly
removed from the "implied" category 2 6 and a requirement was introduced
that disclaimer be specific.2 47 An effective disclaimer might state: "It is
expressly agreed that seller does not warrant his title to the goods and
that full responsibility for defending such claim or interest as is conveyed
by this agreement shall be upon the buyer." Surprisingly, disclaimers of
title warranty technically need not be conspicuous, although the buyer
expects a good title even more than he expects goods of merchantable
quality.2 8 Sellers seeking to deprive buyers of title assurances, however,
should disclaim conspicuously, if commercially practicable, to neutralize
the judicial desire to avoid unfair surprise.
The Code rules also offer the seller a novel opportunity to restrict
indirectly title warranty obligations by limiting the time within which
buyer may assert breach. The title guarantee under the Uniform Sales
Act embraced two distinct warranties: a warranty of title, which could
be breached only at the time the property was transferred, and a warranty
of "quiet possession," which could not be breached until the true owner or
Winston, Inc., 305 N.Y. 180, 111 N.E.2d 871 (1953). Lienors employing the "mini-
mum inventory" device probably would also "complain" of sales in violation of the
security agreement. The purpose, though not the literal wording, of UCC § 2-312
(1) (b) seems to require sellers to indemnify innocent purchasers for the costs of
suits arising out of such "complaints2'
242 See Rundle v. Capitol Chevrolet, Inc., 23 Tenn. App. 151, 157, 129 S.W.2d
217, 221 (1939); Hawkland, In re Articles 1, 2 and 6, 28 TEMP. L.Q. 512, 515-16
(1955); cf. Wilson v. Manhasset Ford, Inc., 27 Misc. 2d 154, 209 N.Y.S.2d 210
(Dist. Ct 1960) (general disclaimer excluding title warranty void as against public
policy). However, at least one court had held the implied title warranty excluded
by a "merger" clause. Baranowski v. Linatsis, 95 N.H. 55, 57 A.2d 155 (1948).
A parol disclaimer of the title warranty was held inadmissible in Calpetro Producers
Snydicate v. Chas. M. Woods Co., 206 Cal. 246, 274 Pac. 65 (1929), but not in Miller
v. Van Tassel, 24 Cal. 458 (1864) (criticized in Calpetro).
243 See UNIFORM SALES ACT § 13.
244See Hawkland, In re Articles 1, 2 and 6, 28 TEaM,. L.Q. 512, 519-20 (1955);
notes 227-32 supra and accompanying text.
2 4 5 See HAwxLAxD, SALES AND BULX SALES (UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE) 48-49 (1955).
2 46 UCC § 2-312, comment 6 (1958 Official Text); see Note, 49 Ky. L.. 240, 251
(1960).
2 "A warranty under subsection (1) will be excluded or modified only by specific
language . . . ." UCC § 2-312(2).
Sales by executors, sheriffs, and similar persons create no warranty of title.
UCC § 2-312(2) & comment 5; accord, UNIFORM SALES ACT § 13(4); 1 WILISTON,
SALES § 220 (rev. ed. 1948).
2 Compare UCC § 2-316(2). Also detracting from the probability of deliberate
omission of a "conspicuous" requirement is the Code Commissioners' own explanation
of the revision of § 2-312(2). See EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE, 1956 REcommENDATioNs 37 ("to conform to the policy of Section 2-316").
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lienor established his dominant claim.24a Since the statute of limitations
began to run only from the accrual of the cause of action, a buyer unaware
of defects in the title tendered him could, upon discovering the defects,
obtain redress under the quiet possession warranty even though his rights
under the title warranty had expired.250  Code section 2-312, however,
consolidates the title and quiet possession warranties into a single cause
of action,2 51 and section 2-725 provides that the Code's four-year statute
of limitations begins to run from the date of tender of delivery, regardless
of the aggrieved party's awareness of the breach.2 52  In addition, in the
original agreement the parties can reduce the limitation period to one
year.2 53 Unless a court disregards this section and holds that actions for
breach of title warranty accrue only upon disturbance of possession,25 "
sellers could limit these suits to instances in which the buyer discovers the
outstanding interest in the goods within a limited time.2 55 The contract
clause, which need not be conspicuous, might provide: "It is agreed that
action must be brought on claims for alleged breach of warranty within
one year from the date of delivery."
III. CLAUSES MINIMIZING THE CONSEQUENCES OF BREAc H
A. Restriction of Remedies
Sellers, forced to eschew sweeping warranty disclaimers to avoid both
judicial notions of unconscionability2 56 and customer resistance,2 5 7 have
249 UNIFoRM SALES Acr § 13; 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 221, at 569-70 (rev. ed.
1948); N.Y. CODE STUDY 388.
250 Ibid.
2Z1 See UCC § 2-312(1) & comment 1.
252 UCC § 2-725(2) & comments. The exception extended in this subsection to
warranties of future performance does not embrace the warranty of title. UCC
§ 2-312, comment 2; N.Y. CODE STUDY 388 n.70; HAWKLAND, Op. Cit. supra note 245,
at 39.
253 UCC § 2-725 (1).
254 See Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code,
63 HA v. L. REv. 561, 578 (1950); Note, 15 U. Prrr. L. REv. 331, 333 (1954).
255 See HAWYCLAND, op. cit. supra note 245, at 39-40, who defends the new Code
rule as lending "finality" to commercial transactions.
The device of reducing the statute of limitations may not limit liability under
quality warranties, since such defects if not easily discoverable within one year
might fall within the "future performance' exception. See note 252 supra.
2 56 "Unconscionability," although generally considered an "equitable" doctrine,
has also been invoked in suits at law. E.g., Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406,
414-15 (1889) (unconscionable contract presumed fraudulent) ; Scott v. United States,
79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 443, 445 (1870). See generally Frank, J., dissenting in Siegel-
man v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 204-06 (2d Cir. 1955); N.Y. CODE
STUDY 731-33.
2 5 7 Few individual sellers have the bargaining power to disclaim all warranties.
Judicial guardianship has discouraged industry-wide adoption of an adhesion contract
to end competition in warranty terms. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,
32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), accounting, perhaps, for the renewed warranty
competition in the automobile industry. See HoNNOLD, CASES ON SALES AND SALES
FINANCING 105 n.c. (2d ed. 1962). Compare Wall Street Journal, Nov. 19, 1963,
p. 1, col. 4.
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commonly resorted to restriction of remedies and limitations of conse-
quential damages. The Code's requirements of conspicuousness and
specificity2 58 and its codification of the unconscionability concept
259 Will
further militate against indiscriminate use of disclaimers, but other rules
also impose more stringent standards for clauses directly limiting liability
than did the prior law. The basic Code rule is subsection 2-719(1) (a) ,260
providing that remedies may be restricted, for example, to repair and
replacement of defective parts 2 61 By ruling that contractually provided
remedies, unless "expressly agreed to be exclusive," will be construed as
additional to the remedies that the buyer could otherwise pursue,2 62 the
Code reflects traditional judicial hostility to abuse of superior bargaining
position 2 63 In the past, a clause "limiting" buyer's remedy for breach of
warranty to repair and replacement of parts usually precluded a suit for
danages 264 But a standard clause limiting the remedy to repair or re-
placement may not signify to the ordinary consumer a relinquishment of
potential personal injury claims.2 65 Accordingly, unless the contractually
provided remedy also states that it supplants all right to sue for personal
or property damage, courts applying the Code will probably hold that it
was not exclusive.
Even if the remedy's exclusivity is clearly expressed in the agreement,
subsection 2-719(2) presents another possible obstacle to enforcement:
"Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its
essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act." This
notion that a remedy has a purpose2 66 occasionally occurred in the prior
law2 67  In Ford Motor Co. v. CullM, s68 a dealer purchased a new car
2 5 8 UCC § 2-316(2).
29 UCC § 2-302.
260 [T]he agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in sub-
stitution for those provided in this Article and may limit or alter the measure
of damages recoverable under this Article, as by limiting the buyer's remedies
to return of the goods and repayment of the price or to repair and replace-
ment of non-conforming goods or parts ....
261 The automobile industry has universally adopted clauses so restricting buyers'
rights. See, e.g., contracts reprinted in HONNOLD, CASES ON SALES AND SALES
FINANCING (2d ed. Supp. 1962, at 422-33).
262 "[R]esort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy is expressly
agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole remedy." UCC § 2-719(1) (b).
263 See VOLD, SALES § 95, at 459 (2d ed. 1959) ; Note, 28 COLUm. L. REV. 466,
467 (1928). A few pre-Code courts, however, held that a remedy provided in the
contract was the buyer's only recourse, even if it were not expressly made exclusive.
E.g., Pottash v. Herman Reach & Co., 272 Fed. 658 (3d Cir. 1921) (wartime con-
ditions), cert. dismissed, 259 U.S. 589 (1922) ; Oltmanns Bros. v. Poland, 142 S.W.
653 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911), writ of error refused, 106 Tex. 644, 142 S.W. 653 (1912).
264 See, e.g., Rasmus v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 158 F. Supp. 70 (N.D. Iowa 1958) ;
Traylor Engr & Mfg. Co. v. National Container Corp., 45 Del. (6 Terry) 142, 70
A.2d 9 (Super. Ct 1949).
265 See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 399-400, 161 A.2d
69, 92-93 (1960).
2 66 See HoNNoLD, CASES ON SALES AND SALES FINANCING 112 n.5 (2d ed. 1962).
267 See STEINHEImE, MICHIGAN SALES LAW AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 179 (1962).
268 96 F,2d 1 (5th Cir. 1938) (Uniform Sales Act).-
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directly from the manufacturer for use as a demonstrator. The contract
contained the usual express warranty against defects in materials and
workmanship, disclaimed all other warranties, and restricted the remedy
to repair and replacement of parts. The car immediately developed
structural defects which neither repair nor replacement of parts could
correct. The court held the contractually exclusive remedy ineffective
under the circumstances and permitted the buyer to rescind and recover the
price 2 69
Under the "failure of essential purpose" doctrine, therefore, courts
may deny effect to an expressly restricted remedy even though the limitation
was not unconscionable at the time of contracting.2 70  Moreover, subsection
2-719(2) further provides that such failure permits buyer the entire range
of remedies provided in the Code, including rescission 271 and suit for
expectancy2 72 with incidental and consequential damages.273 However,
sellers can decrease the significance of the failure of an exclusive remedy's
essential purpose by the following suggested contract provision that upon
the frustration of the primary remedy a secondary exclusive remedy will
take its place:
In the event of breach of the above warranty, it is expressly
understood that the buyer's sole and exclusive remedy shall be
repair or replacement of defective parts, and that the seller
shall not be liable for damages for injury to persons or property.
Should the goods prove so defective, however, as to preclude the
remedying of warranted defects by repair or replacement, the
buyer's sole and exclusive remedy shall then be refund of the
purchase price.
274
Alternatively, the contract could simply provide that "in no event shall
seller be liable for any consequential damages." 7  Upon failure of the
primary remedy of replacement, this clause, if it too does not fail, would
limit the buyer's substituted remedy to direct damages.
276
269 Accord, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 375-77, 161 A.2d
69, 79 (1960).
270 Compare UCC §2-302(1) (unconscionability determined as of time of con-
tracting).
271 See UCC § 2-608. The Code uses the term "revocation of acceptance' in
place of "rescission." See id., comment 1.
272 See UCC §2-714(1) & (2).
273 See UCC §§ 2-714(3), 2-715.
274 Like repair and replacement of parts, refund of the purchase price in exchange
for return of the goods is expressly sanctioned by UCC § 2-719(1) (a). But cf. note
280 infra and accompanying text.
275 Since this clause suggests that an underlying warranty exists, sellers should
not couple it with a warranty disclaimer. Cf. UCC § 2-316, comment 2; 111 U. PA.
L. REv. 132, 135 (1962). But cf. Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F. P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d
497, 499 (1st Cir. 1962).
276 The restricted remedy might still be "prima facie unconscionable," however,
and therefore vulnerable to invalidation. See text accompanying notes 287-304 infra.
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B. Clauses Limiting Consequential Damages
Even if a contractual remedy is manifestly exclusive and yet broad
enough to afford the buyer some protection in all situations, the seller's
draftsman must still counter Code subsection 2-719(3), which threatens a
fundamental purpose of all restriction of remedy clauses-precluding lia-
bility for consequential damages. In the case of commercial losses, this
subsection expressly tests limitation of liability against an unconscion-
ability standard,2 77 and thus merely reemphasizes the applicability of the
Code's general unconscionability provision 2 7 8 to contracts between busi-
nessmen; it does not express an additional judgment against limitation of
liability for the buyer's business losses.
27 9
One of the most common elements of consequential damages among
businessmen is lost profits when seller's failure to deliver frustrates the
buyer's resale of the goods.2 0  Under pre-Code law, buyer could recover
lost profits only if the parties had actually contemplated resale,281 and
perhaps only if the seller knew the terms of existing or contemplated resale
agreements at the time of contracting.2 8 2  The broader Code rule allows
buyer to recover if he is in the business of making resales or if seller had
other reason to know that losses would result from his breach.2 8 3  The
Code also abandons the prior law's rule denying recovery of lost profits
if the goods were easily replaceable in an available market.2 8 4  It requires
the buyer to "cover" whenever possible,2 85 but adds the expense of this
operation to the incidental damages recoverable against the seller.
28 6
Since these new rules increase potential damages, sellers should consider
preventing such recovery by contracting that "In no event shall seller be
liable for incidental or consequential damages."
In the case of consequential damages for personal injuries in sales of
consumer goods, subsection 2-719(3) severely inhibits the use of any
clause designed to restrict the buyer's remedies: "Limitation of conse-
quential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods
277 "Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or
exclusion is unconscionable." UCC § 2-719(3).
278 UCC § 2-302.
279 Compare note 300 infra and accompanying text.
2,80 N.Y. CODE STur 702.
281 Cf. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854) ; accord, e.g.,
Harvey v. Connecticut & P.R.R.R., 124 Mass. 421 (1878); Clyde Coal Co. v. Pitts-
burg & L.E.R.R., 226 Pa. 391, 398-400, 75 Atl. 596, 599-600 (1910). See generally
McColuncK, DAMAGES §§ 138-41, 175, 176 (1935).
282 See, e.g., Czarnikow-Rionda Co. v. Federal Sugar Ref. Co., 255 N.Y. 33,
173 N.E. 913 (1930); Macchia v. Megow, 355 Pa. 565, 570-71, 50 A.2d 314, 316-17
(1947) ; McCoiuxicx, DAMAGES § 176, at 675-76 (1935).
283 UCC § 2-715(2) (a) & comment 6.
284 See, e.g., Czarnikow-Rionda Co. v. Federal Sugar Ref. Co., 255 N.Y. 33,
41, 173 N.E. 913, 915 (1930) ; Grupe v. Glick, 26 Cal. 2d 680, 688, 160 P.2d 832, 837
(1945) (dictum) ; McCoRmIcK, DAMAGES § 176, at 675 (1935).
285 UCC § 2-715 (2) (a) ; see UCC § 2-712.
286 UCC § 2-715 (1).
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is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is
commercial is not." 28 7 The Code thus threatens with unconscionability
not only clauses expressly limiting consequential damages in sales of
consumer goods, but also indirect limitations like restrictions of buyer's
rights to refund of the purchase price, or to repair or replacement of
parts.28 8  At first blush the Code seems plagued with a jarring incon-
sistency, since disclaimers of the underlying warranty, which are similarly
designed to immunize sellers from suits for consequential damages, are not
deemed unconscionable for accomplishing this result.28 9 Nevertheless,
warranty disclaimer is usually an impractical commercial substitute for
limitation of consequential damages, for the pressures of competition 
290
restrain sellers from withdrawing all warranty protection, especially in the
obvious manner that the Code requires.2 91
Sellers of consumer goods who desire to limit consequential damages
for personal injuries are thus remitted to the inexact guidance of sub-
section 2-719(3). The Code defines consumer goods as those "used or
bought for use primarily for personal, family or household purposes," 292
a category that excludes equipment, inventory, and farm products. 298
However, since the goods' characterization is not immutably determined
by the identity of the seller's immediate customer, their identification as
"consumer goods" may yet arise upon subsequent sales.294 Thus, if the
seller's product is eventually destined for personal consumption-as in the
case of an automobile sold from manufacturer to dealer-, the manufac-
turer's limitation of consequential damages for personal injuries seems
"prima facie unconscionable," particularly since injured consumers could
not otherwise hold accountable the party best able to absorb liability and
most likely to be responsible for defective products.295
The effect of subsection 2-719(3)'s designation of the limitations on
consequential damages as "prima facie unconscionable" is explained no-
where in the Code. The term "prima facie" is often used to describe the
strength of a case that compels the opponent to suffer a directed verdict
unless he produces evidence sufficient to support a contrary conclusion.296
287 UCC § 2-719(3). (Emphasis added.)
288 UCC § 2-719(1), empowering sellers to restrict buyers' remedies, is expressly
subordinated to the prima facie unconscionability principle in subsection (3).
289 The official comments carefully segregate disclaimers from the stigma of
unconscionability attaching to limitations of consequential damages. UCC §2-719,
comment 3; see UCC § 2-316, comment 2.
290 See Wall Street Journal, Nov. 19, 1963, p. 1, col. 4.
291 See UCC § 2-316(2); notes 169-70 supra and accompanying text.
292 UCC §§ 9-109(1), 2-103(3).
293 UCC § 9-109, comment 2.
294 Ibid.
295 See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441
(1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
298 See 9 WiGmoRE, EvIDENcE § 2494, at 293 (3d ed. 1940).
[Vol.l12:564
UCC CONTRACT DRAFTSMANSHIP
Upon introduction of the rebutting evidence, however, all dispositive power
of this prima facie case disappears. 29 7 Since the Code gives this definition
to "presumption," 298 subsection 2-719(3) probably would have used the
words "presumptively unconscionable" if it had contemplated merely this
risk of not producing contrary evidence. Moreover, shifting the normal
risk of not producing evidence is unnecessary because evidence of uncon-
scionability probably is neither unavailable nor inconvenient to produce.299
Thus "prima facie," as a modifier of "unconscionable," seems to reflect a
substantive Code policy against imposed limitations on consumers' personal
injury claims.30 0 The seller's reliance on this disfavored clause would
then force him to overcome the "probative weight" of the Code policy by
justifying the clause with evidence of its "commercial setting, purpose and
effect." 301 His probability of success would turn on the meaning of "un-
conscionability." If it means merely unfair surprise,30 2 the seller could
easily vindicate his clause limiting consequential damages by establishing
its prominence in the written agreement or by demonstrating buyer's actual
awareness of it. But, to the extent that "unconscionability" suggests a
lopsided allocation of contract risks,303 rebuttal of subsection 2-719(3)'s
policy judgment that personal injury damage limitations in sales of con-
sumer goods are "prima facie unconscionable" seems extremely difficult.3 0 4
Despite the uncertain validity of limitations of prospective personal injury
damages, the commercial impracticability of broad warranty disclaimers
forces most sellers to attempt damage limitation but realistically to recog-
nize consequential damage liability as a contingency.
IV. CONCLUSION
Sales contract draftsmen must acclimate themselves to the ground
rules for contract formation in article two. Contracts must be reconsidered
to avoid the introduction in evidence of unfavorable parol evidence, trade
usages, and proof of course of dealing under the Code's liberalized standards
297 See Richmond Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Tidewater Constr. Corp., 170 F.2d
392, 394 (4th Cir. 1948); Kath v. Kath, 238 Minn. 120, 124, 55 N.W.2d 691, 693-94
(1952); Mockowik v. Kansas City, St. J. & C.B.R.R., 196 Mo. 550, 571, 94 S.W.
256, 262 (1906) ; 9 WIGMoaz, EVIDENCE § 2491, at 290 (3d ed. 1940).298 UCC § 1-201(31).
299 Compare MORGAN, MAGTIRE & WEINSTEIN, CASES oN EVIDENCE 443 n.5 (4th
ed. 1957).
300 See id. at 443 n.6.
301 UCC § 2-302(2).
302 See UCC § 2-302, comment 1. But see note 180 supra, discussing ambiguity
of this comment.
303 Ibid.
3 04 But under this interpretation, sellers might contend that the invalidating stand-
ard is unconscionability "as a matter of law," UCC § 2-302(1), a phrase which has
meant that the clause will be upheld if the court finds that reasonable men might
differ as to the unconscionability of the limitation. Cf. State v. Ross, 92 Ohio App.
29, 46, 108 N.E.2d 77, 86, appeal disnissed, 158 Ohio St. 248, 108 N.E.2d 282 (1952) ;
Bower v. Brannon, 141 W. Va. 435, 444, 90 S.E.2d 342, 346 (1955). However, "as
a matter of law" may simply designate the question as one for the judge's decision
rather than the jury's.
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for contract interpretation. The newly prominent unconscionability rules
pose problems for sellers with sufficient bargaining power to impose burden-
some terms on buyers. Moreover, the full and lucid disclosure now re-
quired may hamper all sellers from creating their customary legal relation-
ships as buyers express resistance to formerly hidden provisions. Also
troublesome are linguistic innovations of uncertain content like "failure of
essential purpose" and "part of the basis of the bargain." But, as a decade
of experience in Pennsylvania has shown and as its earliest proponents have
steadfastly maintained, the Code "works." 8o5 In contrast to the stultifying
effect of many codifications, the Code's revision of many anachronistic
principles should accelerate the developing harmony between legal and
commercial principles.
Jerome R. Verlin
305 See, e.g., Preface to Del Duca & King, Commercial Code Litigation (mimeo.
ed. 1960) ; Pennsylvania Bankers Commercial Code Committee, Pennsylvania Bankers
Answer Mr. Russo of New York.
